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ABSTRACT

The current study explores the role of selection in predicting workplace safety
using an applied sample of applicants and incumbents in a grocery store chain located in
the Southeastern United States. Namely, both personality-based and overt selection
assessments, a distinction drawn from the integrity testing literature, were used to predict
on-the-job safety performance and safety outcomes. Both types of assessments were
hypothesized to predict two forms of safety performance (compliance and participation),
which, in turn, were expected to predict both objective (i.e., work days missed, restricted
work days, and micro-accidents) and subjective (i.e., near-miss, minor injuries, and
musculoskeletal pain) safety outcomes.
The mediated relationships (personality-based and overt variables predicting
safety outcomes through safety performance) could not be tested with objective safety
outcomes as the dependent variables due to low sample size. When the subjective
outcomes were the dependent variables, this hypothesis was only supported when MSK
pain was the outcome; indirect relationships with minor injuries or near-misses as the
dependent variables were not significant. None of the direct relationships between the
personality variables and the safety outcomes were significant. The second set of
hypotheses proposed the same mediated relationships with the two overt safety variables
as the predictors. Neither direct nor indirect hypothesized relationships reached statistical
significance.
The hypothesized relationships between the selection assessments and safety
performance were also theorized to be moderated by safety climate strength, which is the
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degree to which employees view the company and its practices and policies similarly
(Siehl & Martin, 1990). A strong climate was expected to weaken the predictor-mediator
relationship because strong situations, which provide many cues about how to behave,
decrease individual discretion and foster behavioral homogeneity (Hattrup & Jackson,
1996; Meyer, Dalal & Bonaccio, 2009; Mischel, 1977).
The results of these hypothesis tests indicated that the interaction between any of
the personality variables with safety climate strength did not uniquely predict safety
performance. Likewise, the interaction between both overt safety variables and safety
climate strength did not significantly predict safety performance.
Exploratory analyses suggested that average safety climate was a strong predictor
of safety performance, accounting for over 39% of the variance in this outcome after
controlling for demographics and group membership. Further, safety climate strength was
also significantly related to safety performance above and beyond the effects of safety
climate average. Safety performance and average safety climate were predictive of all
subjective safety outcomes (near-misses, minor injuries, and MSK pain). Limitations and
practical implications of the current study are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Workplace safety is an extremely important issue in the United States. U.S.
employees experienced over 3.2 million non-fatal injuries and illnesses in the workplace
in 2009, almost a third of which required missing days of work; moreover 4,500
employees lost their lives on the job (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). Similarly
disturbing statistics regarding the frequency of occupational accidents and injuries have
been recorded in other countries as well (Zohar, 2000). The Occupational Health and
Safety Administration (OSHA) estimates that occupational illnesses and injuries cost
businesses $170 billion a year (OSHA, 2002), and individual companies bear the brunt of
the expenditures associated with workplace safety incidents. Along with direct costs such
as workers’ compensation payouts, medical charges, legal fees, and increases in
insurance premiums, indirect costs such as lost production and productivity and
diminished employee morale can take a financial toll on an organization (OSHA, 2002).
These risks are not limited to certain dangerous industries. Forcier et al. (2001) explained
that employees in any given job can be exposed to environmental (e.g., heavy machinery,
slippery floors) or situational (driving, heavy lifting, etc.) hazards; consequently, many
companies maintain accident prevention on their list of priorities.
Despite advances in technology and increased monitoring of work sites, which are
the traditional approaches to accident prevention, occupational safety incidents continue
to occur in the workplace, suggesting that other elements are affecting these events
(Shannon, Mayr, & Haines, 1997). Namely, it has been stated that human behavior is a
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prominent cause for industrial accidents (Kamp, 1994; Reason, 1990). Zohar (2000) has
also found evidence to support the notion that unsafe behaviors exhibited by employees
have a much greater effect on safety outcomes than unsafe conditions. The author found
that subunit injury records were not linked to the amount of risk in the unit; rather, the
climate for safety was the antecedent of injuries (to be discussed in detail below). This
also demonstrated the impact that organization-level factors have in determining
occupational safety incidents. Blame for industrial accidents does not fall solely on the
shoulders of employees; rather, managerial as well as broader organizational factors are
also contributing influences (Reason, 1997). Researchers are now extending their
perspective on occupational accidents and injuries to incorporate the idea that individuals
at all levels of an organization, along with situational factors within the company, interact
to affect safety outcomes (Vrendenburgh, 2002). This view is aligned with the
interactionist approach, which recognizes the role that both individuals and their
environment play in producing outcomes (Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
One of the main variables that has arisen from this school of thought is safety
climate, which is defined as employee perceptions of organizational policies, procedures,
and practices pertaining to safety (Zohar, 2003). Safety climate has been described as a
critical component in determining workplace safety (Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur,
2010); it has also been labeled as an important construct in research, because it "describes
a key intersection between organizational and psychological processes and their
relationship with safety" (Neal & Griffin, 2004, p.30). Recent meta-analyses have
demonstrated that safety climates that encourage and support safe behavior at work are
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predictive of fewer occupational injuries than workplaces without this climate in place
(e.g., Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2006a).
Use of Human Resource Practices to Reduce Safety Incidents
Safety research has demonstrated that organizations can benefit financially from
taking proactive measures to prevent safety incidents, incurring fewer expenses related to
lost time and workers’ compensation costs (Vrendenburgh, 2002). For example, in
addition to focusing on organizational-level variables like safety climate, businesses can
also try to decrease occupational accidents and injuries by selecting people that are the
least predisposed to behaving dangerously. Vrendenburgh (2002) found that out of six
management practices (management commitment, rewards, communication and
feedback, selection, training, and participation) examined in 62 hospitals, selection was
the most important in terms of predicting employee injury rates. Specifically, the author
determined that the use of proactive practices (anticipating problems to head them off
before they occur) such as selection and training of new personnel differentiated lowinjury hospitals from high-injury hospitals. Given the fact that reactive behaviors (fixing
problems that have already occurred) are insufficient for preventing injuries, a greater
emphasis in safety literature should be placed on selection.
Other researchers have started to take note of the fact that organizational leaders
should be using selection more frequently to optimize safety, as it is not currently highly
utilized (Lauver, 2007; Wallace & Chen, 2006). In fact, the selection process has been
deemed the “first line of defense an organization has against hiring unsafe workers”
(Forcier et al., 2001, p. 62). Candidates who are inclined to behave in an unsafe manner
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can be screened out or placed into positions fraught with fewer risks (Forcier et al.,
2001). Moreover, once an organization establishes itself as a safety-conscious workplace,
candidates who are inclined to work safely should be drawn to this organization due to
their shared values, further developing a culture of safety (Vrendenburgh, 2002).
A greater emphasis on proactive measures such as selection of safety-inclined
applicants is especially important because these measures can save a business a great deal
of money in the long term. This may especially be important in industries where profit
margins are typically very slim, such as retail grocery. The fact that the accident- and
injury-related costs are so large implies there is a great deal of potential for improvement
(Clarke & Robertson, 1998). Safety-management systems can reduce up to 40 percent of
accidents and save hundreds of thousands of dollars (OSHA, 2002). A news release from
insurance company Liberty Mutual found that productivity was the most frequently-cited
benefit of an effective safety program at work in a survey of 231 financial executives,
followed by reduced costs (Liberty Mutual Group, 2005). Decreased safety-related
expenditures are therefore a benefit that could be realized above and beyond the physical
and mental toll on employees.
Despite the clear advantages to using human resource management (HRM)
practices such as selection to predict occupational accidents and injuries, there is only a
small amount of research that specifically investigates practical HRM strategies to
improve safety. The lack of specific guidelines for the improvement of a climate for
safety and ensuing safety-related behavior has been identified as a major limitation of
current safety climate research (Neal & Griffin, 2004). Neal and Griffin (2004) explained
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that organizations can benefit directly by emphasizing safety-related HRM practices
because the implementation of these practices communicates the importance of safety to
employees, which should orient their actions to behave in a safer manner. Thus, the
inclusion of safety climate and selection measures in the current study allows an
investigation of the organizational- and individual-level factors that have been linked to
occupational injuries and accidents. This approach assumes that safety cannot be
optimized in organizations unless companies aim to predict which employees will behave
in the safest manner, and under what conditions this behavior is facilitated.
This approach is imperative, as both person-related and situation-related factors
have been linked to workplace safety (Christian et al. 2009). Christian and colleagues
(2009) stated that an examination of antecedents of safety using the person-situation
interaction approach is an underexplored research avenue. The authors went on to explain
that many studies regarding safety antecedents fail to incorporate both individual
differences and contextual factors in the same study, typically choosing to include one or
the other. This deficit restricts a full understanding of the “unique or combined influences
of person and situational variables" (Wallace & Chen, 2006, p. 530). The use of both the
employee and the environment as predictors of workplace safety is important, as work
accidents have been stated to be the result of a complex interaction between the two
(Janicak, 1996).
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Gaps in the Safety Literature Addressed by the Current Study
The present study proposed that group-level safety climate strength, or the extent
of group agreement of climate perceptions, would moderate the relationship between two
types of selection measures and safety performance (González-Romá, et al., 2002). The
selection measures were both intended to identify an applicant who is predisposed to
behaving unsafely; one measure attempted to tap this by asking personality-oriented
questions, while the other directly questioned the applicant about his or her safety
behavior. This distinction is drawn from the integrity testing literature, which
distinguishes between personality-based and overt assessments to predict an applicant’s
honesty and likelihood to engage in counterproductive behaviors. The safety-oriented
selection measures were hypothesized to relate to safety performance. Safety
performance, which is comprised of safety participation and compliance, has been
consistently supported as a proximal antecedent to safety outcomes (e.g., Clarke, 2006b;
Jiang et al., 2010; Probst & Brubaker, 2001). Therefore, the present study included this
variable as a mediator of the relationship between the safety selection measures and
safety outcomes. Safety outcomes were operationalized in the present study as accidents
and injuries on the job, as measured by both objective and self-reported outcome
measures (see Figure 1 for the full model).
The current study addresses a series of gaps in the current body of safety
literature. Firstly, safety itself had been largely disregarded in mainstream management
and organizational behavior research until relatively recently, despite the major
implications that workplace safety has on individuals and organizations (Fahlbruch &
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Wilpert, 1999). Secondly, the current study uses a multilevel theoretical perspective to
investigate the antecedents of workplace safety, which research to date has not
traditionally employed (Burke & Signal, 2010). Wallace and Chen (2006) noted that the
safety literature is especially deficient in multilevel studies that incorporate both personal
and situational antecedents. The strength of safety climate has also been suggested as a
possible moderator of the relationship between safety climate and injuries but has yet
been included in such a study (Beus et al., 2010). This study addresses both of these
deficiencies by investigating whether the relationship between safety-relevant personality
traits and safety performance is moderated by safety climate strength at the group level.
The use of safety climate strength, as opposed to mean ratings of safety climate, is
addressing a research deficiency in and of itself, as “very little research actually treats the
degree of ‘sharedness’ of these perceptions as being a property of safety climate worthy
of analysis” (Lingard, Cooke, & Blismas, 2010, p. 1110). The use of climate strength
extends the current literature, which has already established consistently linked mean
safety climate ratings to safety behaviors/ performance (e.g., Cooper & Philips, 2004;
Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000) as well as with actual injuries (e.g., Fullarton & Stokes,
2007) and accidents (e.g., Zohar, 2002). Climate strength, however, has been relatively
unexplored, with even fewer studies including this variable as a moderator; the current
study addresses this by examining safety climate strength as a moderator of the
relationship between safety-relevant personality constructs and safety performance (i.e.,
safety compliance and participation). The use of multilevel research in this domain also
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provides a better framework for the investigation of cross-level effects, which climate
research has traditionally lacked until recently (Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994).
The current study also introduces a novel component by extending the distinction
between overt and personality-based items as used in the integrity literature to
investigation of safety. The goal of this distinction was to examine the predictive ability
of overt vs. covert items, in an effort to guide the inclusion of safety-related items in preemployment assessments.
The following chapter provides a review of the safety literature, beginning with
an explanation of how safety climate arises from broader organizational culture. The
history of safety climate research will be presented, and the way in which climate forms
into a multilevel construct, primarily due to subunit supervisors, will be explained. Next,
a distinction between two types of safety performance will be made (safety compliance
and safety participation), and will detail a history of research that includes this construct.
Research supporting the predictive validity of safety climate will be detailed. Next, the
construct of safety climate strength will be introduced and proposed as a moderator in the
present study. Then, the novel distinction of personality-based versus overt self-report
safety items for the purpose of personnel selection will be described, and will include
benefits and drawbacks associated with each type of test. Next, a description of three
specific personality constructs that are expected to act as distal predictors of safety
outcomes will be given, followed by a description of what the overt safety measures for
selection will entail. Lastly, rationale for each hypothesis will be provided.
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The third chapter will detail the method for the present study, including the
participants, procedure, and design. Justification for each measure and the level at which
it will be examined will be also provided in this section. Results of hypothesized
relationships as well as exploratory analyses can be found in the third chapter. Finally,
chapter four details the limitations and strengths of the current study, as well as the
avenues for future research and practical implications of the findings.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Organizational Culture and Climate
In order to understand safety climate, it must be described within the broader
context of organizational climate, which is a manifestation of organizational culture
(Guldenmund, 2000). In short, organizational culture has been defined as a series of
assumptions that a group shares, which serve to guide employees regarding how to
perceive their work environment (Schein, 1992). Culture provides a frame of reference to
employees to deliver information about what is acceptable and expected in their work
environment (Guldenmund, 2000). It also serves to create a sense of identity for members
of an organization and can foster a feeling of being a part of something larger than
oneself. The positive aspects of these factors have been found to foster organizational
commitment and serve to motivate employees (Wiegmann et al., 2004).
Organizational culture and climate share a few key characteristics; in a review of
safety culture theory and research, Guldenmund (2000) explained that they are both
learned, stable, functional, and multi-dimensional constructs that are shared by groups of
people. However, they are not one in the same; simply put, organizational climate is the
manifestation or outcome of organizational culture (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003).
Organizational culture refers to basic shared assumptions and values, whereas
organizational climate is the “overall meaning organizational members assign to a
particular aspect of the workplace" (Payne et al., 2009, p.735).
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Schneider (1975; 1983) explained that a distinguishing feature of organizational
climates is shared perceptions, which are an agreement between employees about the
practices and procedures of an organization. As such, according to Reichers and
Schneider (1990), organizational climate pertains to the “shared perceptions of the way
things are around here” (p. 22) as opposed to the ideal or desired way things should be
(Dickson, Resick, & Hanges, 2006).
Organizational Climate as Distinct from Psychological Climate
Because climate can be conceptualized at both the psychological and
organizational levels, it is important to distinguish them from each other, as a construct’s
effects on other variables can differ across levels. Namely, psychological climate refers to
individuals’ perceptions about an organization’s policies, procedures, and practices, while
organizational climate is the aggregation of these climate perceptions (Ostroff et al. 2003;
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Thus, organizational climate perceptions constitute a higherlevel construct.
Schneider and colleagues (e.g., Schneider & Bowen, 1993; Schneider, Bowen,
Ehrhart, & Holcombe, 2000) have stated that there are two forms of climate: foundation
and specific. The former refers to “shared perceptions for larger more encompassing
environments and related phenomena (i.e., overall climate)” (Wallace & Chen, 2006, p.
538), whereas a specific climate pertains to shared perceptions about specific dimensions
or areas of interest (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Wallace & Chen, 2006). For example,
research has uncovered climates for service (Schneider, White, & Paul, 1998) and
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innovation (Anderson & West, 1998). The focus of the present review is on the specific
climate for safety.
An investigation of a specific climate for safety is more valuable than looking at a
general organizational climate for the purpose of predicting accidents and injuries, as
safety performance can be more accurately predicted by safety climate than general
organizational climate. This was demonstrated by Neal, Griffin and Hart (2000), who
found that the organizational climate- safety performance relationship was nonsignificant after partialling out the effects of safety climate. Safety climate is also
advantageous over organizational climate when considering predictors of safety
outcomes because it has recently been determined to be a multilevel construct, while
organizational climate is typically analyzed at a single level (Zohar, 2006). In contrast,
safety climate considers organization-level and sub-unit-level factors. As Zohar (2006)
noted, investigating safety climate as a multilevel construct not only reduces conceptual
ambiguity, but also allows organizations to use a single climate score to differentiate
individual supervisors’ priorities from organizational priorities instituted by upper
management.
The following section will provide a history of safety climate research and will
provide a more complete definition for the construct. It will also detail how climate forms
into levels and provide evidence to support the notion that multilevel formation is
primarily due to different subunit supervisors.
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Safety Climate
The history of safety climate research. Weigman and Von Thaden (2007)
explained that the investigation into the root of accident causation has progressed through
four stages throughout the years. Researchers first began theorizing about the origin of
accidents during what has been deemed the technical period, where accidents were
primarily blamed on equipment and mechanical failure. Following the technical period
was the period of human error, where people began to realize the limitations of workers
and started to shift their focus from the mechanics of equipment to the individual
involved in the accident. The sociotechnical period followed, characterized by a focus on
human-technology interactions and bringing forth an interest in ergonomics and system
design. The most recent stage is the period of safety culture, which recognizes the fact
that employees do not operate in a vacuum; rather, they interact within their
organizational environment and culture.
Although the construct of safety climate has been studied as early as the early
1950’s with Keenan et al.’s (1951) investigation into the safety climate of an automotive
plant, the safety culture period was spurred by major incidents that began to reshape
social views on safety (Guldenmund, 2000). For example, a “poor safety culture” was
identified as a contributing factor to the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl in 1986 (Mearns &
Flin, 1999). The understanding that safety culture is important across many industries and
organizations, along with the predictive validity of safety culture, has spurred interest in
this construct, which will be detailed further below (Weigman & Von Thaden, 2007).
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Cooper and Philips (2004) detailed the four primary directions that the last quarter
century of safety climate research has taken, beginning with an investigation into
psychometric measurement and the factor structure of safety climate assessments.
Another direction has focused on antecedents of safety climate; a third has investigated
its relationship to safety performance. Lastly, the way in which safety climate is related to
broader organizational climate has been explored. Neal and Griffin (2004) summarized
that safety culture research has emerged from a focus on its measurement to an
investigation of the creation of a positive climate and the outcomes associated with it.
The present review extends the safety climate literature by utilizing a person-situational
interaction perspective to predict safety behavior and subsequent occupational accidents
and injuries.
Safety climate defined. There have been numerous definitions of safety climate,
and with them, a divergence in opinions on the factor structure and appropriate
measurements of the construct (for a review, see Guldenmund, 2000). However, a
number of commonalities exist between these definitions, which include the fact that
safety climate constitutes a psychological phenomenon, is concerned with intangible
issues, and refers to a specific point in time that is subject to change (Guldenmund,
2000).
Although Zohar first operationalized safety climate in 1980, the author has since
redefined safety climate to reflect additional findings by other researchers. His most
recent definition stated that safety climate
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Refers to shared perceptions among members of an
organization with regard to aspects of the organizational
environment that inform role behavior, that is, the extent to
which certain facets of role behavior are rewarded and
supported in any organization. (Zohar & Luria, 2005, p.616)
The key influences on climate are policies, procedures, and practices that are
actually carried out, as opposed to formalities that may or may not be enacted. This is due
to the fact that only the former indicates an organization’s true priorities (Zohar, 2000;
Zohar & Luria, 2005), which help guide employee behavior. These outcome expectations
regarding safety are created through organizational norms and are the value of creating a
strong safety climate (Ostrom et al., 1993).
Policies and procedures are created and maintained at an organization level;
policies refer to a company’s goals and their means to see them through, while
procedures are the guidelines for carrying out the policies. Practices, on the other hand,
are the implementation of policies and procedures; maintained at the workgroup level,
individual supervisors have discretion in their practices, creating between-group variance
in practices (Payne et al., 2009). Payne and colleagues explained that practices are
especially important to take note of, because they guide employees’ daily behavior and
also serve to "highlight any disconnect between what the organization claims is important
(i.e., policies and procedures) and what organizational agents (i.e., supervisors) model as
important” (p. 735). Discrepancies between organizational policies and procedures and
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supervisory practices help shape safety climate because employees perceive the types of
behaviors that are supported and rewarded and behave accordingly (Payne et al., 2009).
The formation of climate safety and its link to accidents and injuries. Climate
in an organization forms as employees take note of the priorities in their workplace. For
example, the statements made and actions carried out by managers and coworkers
provide clues as to how highly safety is valued in the workplace. Other aspects of work,
such as its pace and emphasis on teamwork, can help employees perceive the relative
priority of safety compared to these other aspects. Accordingly, the alignment between
espousals and enactments is an important part of climate formation (Zohar, 2010). Zohar
(2010) clarified that many organizations declare that safety is a high-priority issue, yet
when “operational demands such as production pressures or costs” arise, safety
procedures are frequently compromised to accommodate these competing demands (p.
1518). The disparity between words and deeds provides implicit additional clues to
workers about the relative priority of safety, shaping their climate perceptions. This gap
and subsequent climate perceptions should become clearer over time as patterns from
situations emerge (Zohar, 2010).
Climate perceptions are also theorized to arise through social interaction with
coworkers, as employees integrate the perceptions of coworkers into their own
(Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Zohar, 2010). This proposition is supported by research
demonstrating that social influence from interacting with others leads to changes in
individual’s feelings and behaviors (Rashotte, 2007). Climate also develops when
employees notice the types of behaviors that are valued and rewarded and subsequently
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act in a manner that is aligned with this type of behavior (i.e. keeping in line with the
climate; Jiang et al., 2010; Payne et al., 2009). Zohar (2000) explained that policies that
diverge from rewards create inconsistencies; one example would be to reward
productivity, albeit obtained through unsafe behaviors, while instituting safety rules.
Climate formation is also influenced when employees notice the types of
behaviors that are expected and supported (Payne et al., 2009). Employees notice how
often and how quickly supervisors deal with safety-related issues at work, which allows
them to estimate what they can expect when they behave safely or unsafely. This, in turn,
affects motivation, creating the foundation for a positive safety climate-safety behavior
relationship at the unit level (Zohar, 2000). It has also been suggested that employees
who work in a safer unit may perceive that their supervisor values their welfare, and
reciprocate by behaving safely (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). Thus, climates that
reinforce safe behavior should lead to fewer occupational accidents and injuries than
climates that do not (Beus et al., 2010; Neal & Griffin 2006; Zohar, 2003).
Multilevel climate formation. As previously stated, employees form perceptions
based on their environment and their interactions with coworkers and supervisors.
Because organizations are typically nested into workgroups such as units, divisions, or
departments, climate automatically develops into levels, where “the higher order factor of
safety climate should reflect the extent to which employees believe that safety is valued
within the organization" and “the first-order factors of safety climate should reflect
perceptions of safety-related policies, procedures, and rewards” (Griffin & Neal, 2000, p.
348).
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There are multiple simultaneous processes that facilitate the formation of safety
climate in a hierarchy. Burke and Signal (2010) pointed out that some departments may
have more exposure to workplace hazards than others, which could contribute to variance
in safety climate within the same organization. Furthermore, there are individual
differences in the way that employees perceive and react to these risks, fostering the
creation of “safety subcultures” (Burke & Signal, 2010, p. 14).
Climate also forms into levels because managers have discretion in the policies
and procedures they execute in individual subunits, although they are created at the
organization-level (Zohar, 2000). Zohar (2006) elaborated that while supervisors have
discretion in how they implement an organization’s procedures, their range of actions is
still restricted by those company-level directives. This clarifies why group climate scores
are not only a lower-order factor under the overarching organization-level climate, but
why group climates are also correlated with organization-level climate (Zohar, 2006).
Thus, safety climate can be distinguished in terms of organization-level (instituted
company procedures and actions by top management) and group-level safety climate
(shared perceptions of the safety-related policies, procedures, and practices of a
company; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2006).
Support for the concept of safety climate as a group-level variable in addition to
an organizational variable was established by Zohar in 2000. A total of 534 production
workers completed a measure of safety climate, and accident/injury data were collected
for the following five months. Zohar found that safety climate as a group-level construct
was supported through three validation criteria: within-group homogeneity, between-
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group variance, and predictive validity. In other words, employees had cohesive
perceptions of the climate, these perceptions varied across workgroups and also exhibited
a positive relationship with the injury/accident data collected over the five-month period.
This research demonstrated that sources of safety climate perceptions relate to two levels
of analysis (organization-level and group-level); the view of safety climate as a multilevel
construct is now widely accepted among researchers.
The distinction between safety climate at an organization-level and at a grouplevel has implications for the consequences that are associated with employee actions;
namely, group-level behaviors occur more frequently and have more immediate results in
comparison with organization-level (e.g., frequent feedback from supervisors; Zohar &
Luria, 2005). These sorts of distinctions clarify why group-level constructs are arguably
stronger predictors of outcomes such as safety performance than organization-level
constructs (Zohar & Luria, 2005). Lingard, Cooke, and Blismas (2010) expounded that
workers typically have much more contact with the supervisors and coworkers in their
direct workgroup, as compared to management at the top of the organization. These
interactions influence behavior and help not only clarify why group-level climates form
but also why these climates are linked to behaviors. The present study focuses on grouplevel safety climate and group-level safety climate strength; the latter will be discussed in
greater detail below.
The role of the supervisor in multilevel climate formation. Although there are
many processes that coincide to create different climates within the same company,
researchers have typically theorized that lower-level supervisors are the true catalyst for
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multilevel climate formation. In fact, Zohar (2000) stated that safety climate as a
multilevel construct is based on the assumption that companies create policies and
procedures that must be executed at the level of the subunit. Supervisors have discretion
over the policies and procedures they actually carry out and dissimilarities in terms of the
manner in which they do so. They could also diverge from the rules due to possessing
their own agenda. Burke and Signal (2010) stated that supervisors may not uniformly
convey top managements’ beliefs about the importance of safety to their respective
workgroups, or they themselves may hold varied beliefs about the importance of safety.
The authors elaborated that this may particularly be the case when supervisors hold
beliefs contrary to top management about who is responsible for maintaining safety in an
organization.
Managers also may vary in terms of how effectively they communicate the
relative priority of safety as well as how they respond to safety-related actions (Ford &
Tetrick, 2011). For example, a manager who praises an employee for behaving safely or
considers this aspect of the employee’s performance when allocating raises conveys that
safety is a priority in the organization, more so than a manager who does not engage in
these behaviors. Managers also play a large role in aspects of work that indirectly affect
safety and employees’ perception of its priority, including pace of work and job training
programs (Vrendenburgh, 2002). Zohar (2000) explained that differences in managers’
safety-related behaviors are inherent in organizations, because policies and procedures
established at the top of the organization cannot guide every single situation that could
arise in the organization. Thus, supervisors must have a degree of discretion in the
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implementation of policies, giving rise to between-group variation in perceptions of
procedures and subsequent formation of safety climate. The role of workgroup
supervisors, therefore, is arguably the largest contributing factor to the hierarchical nature
of climate.
The theory that supervisors are the main reason that climate levels and strength
vary by group has been empirically demonstrated. Management commitment to safety
has long been established as a major factor that determines whether an organization’s
safety program will or will not be successful (Zohar, 1980). Research conducted by
Simard and Marchand (1995; 1997) demonstrated that the likelihood that workgroups
will engage in safety initiatives and comply with safety-related rules is best predicted by
supervisory practices, while the commitment of top management only provided a small
amount of incremental variance. Similarly, the number of safety-related behaviors and
incidents was linked to perceptions of supervisors’ safety actions (Johnson, 2007).
Griffin, Burley, and Neal (2000) found that changes in leadership lead to changes in
safety climate as well as safety compliance and participation. Another study showed that
perceived safety climate can be improved with the use of a safety-specific
transformational leadership style (Barling et al., 2002); similarly, Zohar (2002) found
leadership style affected injury records through safety climate. More recently, Zohar and
Luria (2005) established that safety climate formed at the unit-level due to different
leadership processes.
Thus, the role of the supervisor in creating group-level safety climate and
subsequent safety-related behaviors and performance cannot be overstated. The centrality
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of management involvement and commitment to safety is further supported by the fact
that although researchers have conceptualized safety climate as having anywhere from
two to nine dimensions, this dimension is nearly always included. Its inclusion is intuitive
when considering the fact that managerial support formalizes employees’ expectations of
safety-related behavior (Ford & Tetrick, 2011; Neal & Griffin, 2004).
This rationale supports the use of a single manager-oriented dimension to
examine safety climate, which is the type of measure the current study employs.
Additionally, it has been noted that the purpose of the safety climate assessment should
be the determining factor in whether a higher-order factor is more appropriate than
precise first-order factors, including an examination of safety climate on safety outcomes
as a whole (Griffin & Neal, 2000). This is especially true when specific first-order factors
that were found in a particular research study may not apply to a different work
environment, such as the one included in the present study. Cooper and Philips (2004)
stated that a safety climate factor should only be included if it is hypothesized to predict
safety performance, as this is the ultimate purpose for measuring safety climate. The
authors went on to say that it is likely that divergences in reported factor structures may
in actuality be due to methodological differences. Thus, the current study employs a
single-factor safety climate measure that focuses on the actions of the direct supervisor.
The following section will review research pertaining to safety performance, which is
comprised of safety participation and safety compliance, and is included in the present
study as a proximal antecedent of safety outcomes.
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Safety Performance
Safety participation and safety compliance. Safety performance refers to the
actions or behaviors that employees carry out to support their own safety as well as that
of their coworkers, and is typically described in terms of safety compliance and safety
participation (Burke & Signal, 2010). These dimensions are based on Borman and
Motowidlo’s (1993) distinction between task and contextual job performance dimensions,
where the former is a formally mandated component of an employee’s job and the latter
constitutes informal extra-role behaviors (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Jiang et al., 2010).
According to Griffin and Neal (2000), safety compliance is defined as the “core safety
activities that need to be carried out by individuals to maintain workplace safety,” (p.
348) whereas safety participation refers to “behaviors such as participating in voluntary
safety activities or attending safety meeting” (p. 348). Thus, whereas compliance directly
contributes to workplace safety (e.g., wearing personal protective equipment),
participation indirectly contributes it by creating a safety-supportive environment (e.g.,
attending safety meetings; Griffin & Neal, 2000).
Employees who exhibit safety compliance and participation are less likely to have
accidents and injuries at work because they are following safety rules and procedures
(compliance) and taking proactive measures to address potential risks (participation;
Jiang et al., 2010). Christian and colleagues (2009) emphasized the importance of
distinguishing safety-related behaviors from their outcomes. For one, they are
conceptually different in that safety performance behaviors are intangible, whereas
“safety outcomes are tangible events or results, such as accidents, injuries, or fatalities"
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(p. 1104). Furthermore, the relationships that other constructs have with safety
performance and with safety outcomes are different; in fact, safety performance is
frequently identified as a direct antecedent of safety outcomes (e.g., Neal & Griffin,
2004). Thus, it is important to distinguish between them in empirical research. The
outcomes traditionally linked to safety performance will be explained below.
Outcomes of safety performance. Safety performance is commonly included in
safety-related models as an antecedent of safety outcomes such as accidents, near misses,
and injuries. Accidents are unintentional and undesirable occurrences which are
frequently triggered by human errors or lapses on the part of the worker (Neal & Griffin,
2006), and are said to be preceded by complex employee-environment interactions
(Janicak, 1996). Near misses, on the other hand, are incidents that could have resulted in
an injury but did not (Goldenhar et al., 2003). Near-misses can be conceptualized as
warnings, as minor incidents in the past are said to be the foundation for subsequent ones.
Furthermore, near-misses may only differ from actual injury-causing accidents due to
chance or because a final trigger event is missing (Vrendenburgh, 2002).
The inclusion of safety performance in safety-related research is beneficial
because it is a measurable criterion that has a closer relationship to psychological factors
than safety outcomes (Christian et al., 2009). Accordingly, the direct prediction of safety
performance as opposed to accidents and injuries is more precise, as accidents are by
nature low-frequency occurrences and typically have skewed distributions (Neal &
Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2000). In support of this theory, safety performance as measured by
safety participation and compliance has been consistently and directly linked to safety
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outcomes (e.g., Clarke, 2006b; Jiang et al., 2010; Probst & Brubaker, 2001). A recent
meta-analysis that included six independent effect sizes and 1,876 participants
established that a safety performance composite (compliance and participation combined)
has a -.31 mean corrected correlation with accidents and injuries; the findings of this
study were strengthened by the use of structural equation modeling to test the
researchers’ hypotheses (Christian et al., 2009).
Safety performance is frequently examined as a mediator, linking safety outcomes
to constructs such as safety motivation (Probst & Brubaker, 2001). To date, much of the
safety literature supports the “theoretical modeling of the role of distal (e.g., personality)
and more proximal antecedents (i.e., safety motivation and safety performance) to these
outcomes" (Burke & Signal, 2010, p. 30). The incorporation of distal and proximal
antecedents of safety outcomes along with the inclusion of safety performance has been
noted to provide insight into the process behind workplace safety, yet remains in an early
stage of study (Burke & Signal, 2010). Thus, the current study extended this literature by
including the distal antecedents of personality and overt safety behavior self-reports
along with the proximal antecedents of safety performance. Furthermore, the research
built on person-situation interaction research by including the situational variable of
safety climate strength along with these individual-level predictors. Now that nature of
safety climate and safety performance has been detailed, the following section will
provide additional evidence for the predictive validity of safety climate.
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The Predictive Validity of Safety Climate
Since its introduction as a construct by Zohar in 1980, a large body of research
has supported the predictive validity of safety climate. The first major outcome
associated with safety climate is safe behavior, which is also frequently referred to as
safety performance; the second major outcome is actual accidents and injuries, typically
measured in terms of frequency. To date, numerous studies have directly linked safety
climate with safety behaviors/ performance (e.g., Cooper & Philips, 2004; Griffin &
Neal, 2000; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000) as well as with actual
injuries (e.g., Fullarton & Stokes, 2007; Hoffman & Mark, 2006) and accidents (e.g.,
Mearns et al., 2003; Wallace, Popp, & Mondore, 2006; Zohar, 2002). A sampling of this
research will be presented below.
Johnson (2007) conducted a study with the specific purpose of investigating the
predictive validity of safety climate. A total of 292 employees located in one of three
manufacturing plants of the same organization completed Zohar and Luria’s (2005) 16item safety climate survey, in which participants respond to items regarding their
immediate supervisors’ actions. Safety behavior was recorded at the group level over a
five-month period by a safety professional, who completed an injury-prevention
behavioral checklist by observing employees. Safety outcomes were operationalized as
the frequency and severity of on-the-job injuries and were collected from OSHA records
for the previous year.
Upon analyzing the results, Johnson found that safety climate exhibited a strong
relationship with the percentage of safe behavior, which was the ratio of unsafe to safe
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observations (r = .78). Safety climate was also significantly related to injury severity (r =
.50), which was operationalized as lost workdays due to accident involvement; these
results suggested that fewer lost workdays were incurred with improvements in safety
climate. Contrary to Johnson’s (2007) hypothesis, the safety climate - injury frequency
relationship failed to reach statistical significance. However, the author was still able to
support the hypothesis when structural equation modeling revealed that the relationship
was significant after safe behavior was added as a mediating variable (i.e., climate affects
safe behavior, which, in turn, affects injury frequency). He concluded that these results
suggest that safety climate serves as a prerequisite for safe behavior, which, in turn, can
predict injury frequency. The findings of this study were stronger than previous studies
that linked safety climate to self- reported safe behavior (e.g., Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996)
since the obtainment of objective outcome measures bypassed the limitation of common
method variation.
Additional support for the predictive validity of safety climate was provided by
Garcia, Boix, and Conosa (2004), who conducted a study in Spain in which 734
production workers participated. The results indicated that workers who perceived their
environments to have low safety climates also reported that they were less likely to
comply with safety rules in the previous three months (68% compared to 98% of their
high safety climate counterparts). Furthermore, low safety climate employees were also
less likely to behave safely compared to employees working in a more positive safety
climate (21% compared to 41%), operationalized as the degree to which employees
excessively expose themselves to risk at work.
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Another study was conducted by Clarke (2006a) that included over 17,600
individuals across 31 studies to establish the safety compliance – safety performance
relationship through meta-analysis. The author found safety climate was significantly
related to safety compliance (ρ = .43) as well as safety participation (ρ = .50). Safety
climate also had a weaker relationship with occupational accidents and injuries (ρ = -.22),
which existed in both retrospective and prospective study designs. These findings
indicate that individuals working in a stronger safety climate will be more inclined to
comply and participate with safety initiatives and also have a reduced chance of being
involved in an accident or injury at work.
Similar results were reported a few years later in a meta-analysis conducted by
Christian et al. (2009). Namely, safety climate was found to be related to individual-level
compliance (ρ = .48) and participation (ρ =.59); the authors also estimated a complianceparticipation composite effect (ρ = .49). Additionally, group-level effects were found,
with safety climate exhibiting similar relationships with compliance (ρ =.40),
participation (ρ =.59) and the compliance-participation composite (ρ = .51). Safety
climate also had a weak but significant negative relationship with the safety outcomes of
occupational accidents and injuries (ρ = -.14). In terms of levels of analysis, safety
climate generally had stronger relationships with safety performance when analyzed at
the group and organization level than at the individual level.
Studies conducted by Neal and Griffin have addressed the directionality of the
relationship that safety climate has demonstrated with safety performance and accident
and injury outcomes. This is important, as some researchers have pointed out that
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perceptions of safety climate could be the result of accidents and injuries that occur on
the job, as opposed to serving as a prerequisite for them. In order to investigate this issue,
Neal and Griffin (2006) conducted a longitudinal study with 135 employees in various
positions in an Australian hospital. Participants completed self-report measures of safety
climate and safety behavior (participation and compliance) in the second and fourth year
of the study. Information concerning the number and type of injuries in which each work
group was involved was retrieved from the hospital’s database for all five years of the
study, which began in 1996 and ended in 2000.
One of the findings of the study was group safety climate measured in the second
year of analysis was predictive of year four safety participation (but not safety
compliance), after controlling for negative affect. Results of the study also suggested that
year four safety behavior was predictive of year five accidents, indicating that “changes
in self-reported safety behavior were associated with a subsequent reduction in accidents”
at the group level (Neal & Griffin, 2006, p. 951). The authors concluded that behavior
precedes accidents and that reverse causation would not explain their findings.
Another longitudinal study conducted with Swedish construction workers found
safety climate to be predictive of self-reported safety behaviors after seven months, when
time one safety behavior was controlled (Pousette Larsson, & Törner, 2008). Finally,
safety climate has been predictive of other beneficial outcomes besides those associated
with safety, including psychological well-being (Oliver, Cheyne, Tomás, & Cox, 2002),
work stress (Morrow & Crum, 1998), and job attitudes such as organizational
commitment and job satisfaction (Clarke, 2010). Now that the predictive validity of
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safety climate has been well-established, the related concept of safety climate strength
will be introduced as a hypothesized moderator of the relationship between the safety
selection measures and safety performance in the current study.
Climate Strength
Although the benefits of a positive safety climate have been well-established,
climate strength, which is the extent to which group members climate perceptions agree,
has been relatively unexplored; in fact, it has been labeled by some researchers as an
“unattended scientific construct” (González-Romá, Peiró, & Tordera, 2002, p. 465).
Researchers can examine this construct by examining the variance in climate perceptions,
as opposed to the mean of aggregated climate ratings that is traditionally examined in
safety climate research (Dickson, Resick, & Hanges, 2006). The presence of a strong
climate is an indication that employees view the company and its practices and policies
similarly, and where the values espoused by the organization are manifested in employee
behaviors (Siehl & Martin, 1990).
Stronger climates are expected to lead to more consistent employee behaviors
because they “reflect less ambiguity of organizational norms and practices, leading to
more uniform perceptions and expectations among members" (Dickson, Resick, &
Hanges, 2006, p. 352). This theory was supported by Dickson et al. (2006), who used
data from the well-known Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness
studies (i.e., Project GLOBE) that included 3,783 employees from 123 organizations (see
House, Javidian, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002 for a review). The results of the study
suggested that organizational climates that were characterized by ambiguity (i.e., low
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within-organization agreement of perceptions of organizational norms, policies, and
procedures) also tended to have a weaker climate. The theory behind this construct is
based on Mischel’s (1973) idea that ambiguous contexts determine the degree of
situational strength in an environment. González-Romá, et al. (2002) explained that a
large degree of variety in behavioral responses arise from weak situations because
employees are ambiguous regarding how they should behave; in contrast, strong
situations give rise to more uniform behaviors, since employees have similar ideas of
what types of responses are appropriate in a given situation.
Researchers agree that perfect agreement among group members is unlikely to
exist (Dickson et al., 2006), and knowledge about variance in climate perceptions across
groups can provide useful information to a company (Lindell & Brandt, 2000). For
example, an organization may find that despite the presence of formal organizational
safety policies and procedures, an individual supervisor is inconsistent in his or her
implementation of them, leading to a weak safety climate (Burke & Signal, 2010). In fact,
Zohar and Luria (2004) found that safety climate strength was predicted by the
consistency of supervisors’ decisions. A year later, the same authors found that
procedural coherence (consistency in following policies and procedures) predicted
organizational climate strength, which, in turn, fostered group climate strength. The
authors concluded that the establishment of more formal procedures limits supervisors’
discretionary behaviors and strengthens climate. A recent study by Lingard et al. (2010)
also found that safety climates that are weak (i.e., low consensus) are also more likely to
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be low (i.e., safety is a low priority), whereas strong climates were more likely to be high
(Lingard, Cooke, & Blismas, 2010).
Climate strength has been increasingly accepted as a scientific construct due to its
alignment with Chan’s (1998) typology of composition models. Of the five models Chan
proposed, climate research typically involves the direct consensus model, which refers to
within-unit agreement. González-Romá et al. (2002) clarified that “in dispersion models,
within-unit agreement is used as the operationalization of a unit-level construct” and go
on to point out that constructs of this nature infrequently appear in organizational
literature (p. 465). This diverges from other models because the degree of within-unit
agreement serves as its own focal construct, as opposed to a prerequisite for aggregating
climate perceptions to a higher level (González-Romá, Peiró, & Tordera, 2002).
The conceptualization of safety climate as a construct that can not only be
positive or negative, but can also be strong or weak, is fitting with the notion that climate
is an inherently multilevel construct. Zohar and Luria (2005) explained that organizationlevel climate is created through organizational policies and procedures that are clear and
continuously maintained, while group-level climate is created when supervisors fail to
maintain this stability and unambiguity; climate strength therefore arises when
managerial action forms a coherent pattern.
Recent research has supported climate strength’s predictive validity; for example,
Lingard, Cooke, and Blismas (2010) reported injury frequency rates to be significantly
lower (two-thirds the magnitude) for workgroups with strong and high safety climates.
Although relatively few studies have examined safety climate strength as a moderator,
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current findings appear to support the construct as a moderator of mean climate –
outcome relationships (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2002, Gonzalez-Roma et al., 2002; Schneider
et al., 2002). The current study builds upon this literature by examining safety climate
strength as a moderator of the relationship between safety-relevant personality constructs
and safety performance (i.e., safety compliance and participation).
Integrity Test Distinctions Applied to Safety
Safety-relevant personality constructs are included in the present study as
predictors of safety performance. While relationships between the personality constructs
included and safety performance have been previously established, the present study
introduces a novel component by comparing the strength of personality- performance
relationships with those of the relationship between overt safety items and performance.
The following section details the distinction between overt and personality-based
measures for the purpose of selection. This typology originates in the integrity literature
and is applied in the current study to the safety literature. Researchers of integrity tests
have debated the use of personality –based items as compared to overt items; this
investigation is extended in the present study to the domain of safety. Determining the
utility of each type of test should facilitate more informed decisions when companies
include safety components to their selection systems.
Researchers and practitioners have employed a variety of assessments in an effort
to predict which employees are most prone to behaving unsafely on the job, ranging from
previous accident histories (Hatchette, 1990) to drug testing (Current, 2002). However,
selection as a human resource strategy to reduce accidents and injuries in the workplace
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is underutilized and understudied. One type of instrument that has been widely used for
selection purposes across industries is integrity tests, which have garnered much interest
and research over the past few decades (Neuman & Baydoun, 1998). In fact, it has been
posited that integrity tests may be the most frequently researched assessment for
occupational use (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 2003). This type of test aims to assess
job applicants’ honesty, and is administered with the purpose of screening out employees
who are predisposed to, and most likely to engage in counterproductive behaviors, such
as theft (Alliger, Lilienfeld, & Mitchell, 1996; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998).
One benefit of integrity tests is that they may not demonstrate adverse impact the
way other selection measures, such as cognitive ability tests, typically do. This was
evidenced by Ones and Viswesvaran (1998), who conducted a study in which data from
over 700,000 job applicants was collected. The authors found that although there were
gender differences (i.e., women scored higher on overt integrity tests compared to men),
only very small differences existed for applicants over or under 40 years old, and only
trivial differences existed when minority groups were compared to white applicants.
Given the fact that this type of test has exhibited limited adverse impact, it is likely that
using this assessment format for safety will have the same benefit.
Personality-based and overt selection tests. Sackett, Burris, and Callahan
(1988) identified two broad categories of integrity tests based on Cronbach’s (1970)
clarification of assessment types, where the purpose of the test is either clear or disguised.
The first and most frequently used type of integrity test is of the overt nature (Sackett &
Harris, 1984). Overt tests generally ask applicants to report prior deviant behavior or
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gauge their attitudes about the frequency or punishment of dishonest behaviors (Alliger &
Dwight, 2000; Mumford et al., 2001). For example, test-takers may be questioned about
whether they believe theft to be a substantial issue, with the belief that those who are
more likely to engage in devious behavior may attempt to normalize it. The purpose is to
use this information to estimate the employees’ inclination towards future behaviors of
this type (Whitney et al., 1999).
The second type of integrity test is personality-based, also known as a covert
assessment, because the purpose of the assessment is not readily apparent (Neuman &
Baydoun, 1998). Personality-based integrity tests try to predict counterproductive
behavior by tapping underlying psychological traits that predispose people to behaving in
this manner (Alliger & Dwight, 2000; Sackett, Burris, & Callahan, 1989). For example,
characteristics that have been included in such tests include impulse control, sociability,
and adjustment (Gough, 1971; Neuman & Baydoun 1998; Ones, Viswesvaran, &
Schmidt, 1993). The focus of these tests differs in terms of what criteria they aim to
predict (Neuman & Baydoun, 1998). Namely, where overt tests attempt to predict narrow
outcomes such as theft and related behaviors, personality-based tests have not been
developed solely for this purpose, and are frequently used to predict a much broader
range of undesirable work-related behaviors, such as disciplinary problems or on-the-job
violence or drug use (Ones et al., 1993).
Criterion-related validity of integrity tests. Multiple meta-analyses have
demonstrated the construct validity of integrity tests, supporting their utility for
predicting numerous outcomes of interest. For example, Ones, Viswesvaran, and Schmidt
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(1993) meta-analyzed 665 validity coefficients (576,460 data points), finding that both
types of tests were able to predict a composite measure of counterproductive behavior,
which included disciplinary problems, disruptiveness, tardiness, absenteeism, and
citations for negligence, among others (mean validity of all integrity tests = .47 when
corrected for unreliability). Overt tests were found to be the stronger predictor of
counterproductive work behaviors, with a mean validity coefficient of .41 compared to
.32 for personality-based tests. The authors concluded that overt tests may be more useful
in predicting these sorts of outcomes, but that this inference could be due to moderator
variables.
More recently, Van Iddekinge, Roth, Raymark, and Odle-Dusseau (2012)
conducted a meta-analysis to the criterion-related validity of integrity tests. The authors
imposed more stringent and focused inclusion criteria in terms of samples, designs, and
variables to be included in their study (e.g., individual-level data). A total of 104 studies
(42 published, 62 unpublished) representing 134 independent samples were included in
the meta-analysis. The results of the analysis suggested that a moderately large
relationship between integrity tests and counterproductive work behaviors (CWB) does in
fact exist, estimating mean validity corrected for unreliability to be .32. This value
increased to .36 when corrected for indirect range restriction as well. Similarly to Ones et
al. (1998), Van Iddekinge et al. (2012) found overt tests to be stronger predictors of CWB
compared to personality-based assessments (corrected validity estimate = .38 and .27,
respectively). Lastly, the authors found the source of the criterion to moderate the
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integrity test- CWB relationship, such that the relationship was stronger (.42) when CWB
were measured via self-reports and considerably weaker using employee records (.15).
Although both types of tests appear to be able to predict relevant job outcomes,
there are inconsistent results regarding which form is best able to predict various criteria
(Neuman & Baydoun, 1998). For example, Neuman and Baydoun (1998) found that
personality-based integrity tests demonstrated incremental variance over overt tests when
predicting self-reported theft and counterproductive work behaviors. However, a study by
Frost and Rafilson (1989) found that while both types of tests comparably predicted
counterproductive work behaviors, only the overt honesty scale was predictive of theft
and on-the-job drug use. Results from a lab study conducted by Mumford et al. (2001)
suggested that personality-based tests have superior validity evidence. Lastly, Ones et al.
(2003) found personality-based tests to be stronger predictors of absenteeism compared
to overt assessments. Another inconsistency in this body of research is whether these
types of tests are assessing the same underlying characteristics, as some have found this
to be the case (e.g., Mumford, et al., 2001) and some have not (e.g., Frost & Rafilson,
1989). In sum, inconsistencies in this body of literature indicate that additional research
could provide additional insight into how these types of assessments can predict
employee behavior.
Benefits and drawbacks of the types of integrity tests. Additional research
findings have suggested a number of benefits and drawbacks associated with both types
of integrity assessments. For example, Whitney et al. (1999) found that their sample of
260 university students perceived overt integrity tests to have greater face validity and
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job relatedness than personality-based tests. The authors explained that these sorts of
perceptions are important because applicants are likely to use selection procedures as a
proxy for the organization as a whole if they have little information about a company.
Assessments that are perceived as unrelated to the job or objectionable in other ways
could result in reduced motivation for completion of the selection test or even increase
the chance that the applicant could turn down an offer of employment from the company
(Whitney et al., 1999).
Another aspect of integrity tests that appears to be affected by the type is
susceptibility to faking and coaching. Debate surrounding whether applicants can
intentionally distort their responses on selection measures and whether this affects
selection utility has continued for years. Although there does not appear to be a
consensus regarding faking on non-cognitive measures, evidence exists to support the
notion that applicants can and do distort responses when completing selection measures.
Alliger and Dwight (2000) conducted a meta-analysis in an attempt to investigate the
extent to which applicants exhibit this behavior on integrity measures. The authors found
that although scores on both types of integrity tests can be increased by coaching and
instructions to fake, personality-based tests were more resistant to both, concluding that
“not all self-report non-cognitive measures are equally fakable" (p. 6).
Although it is beyond the scope of the present review to investigate each of these
arguments with respect to safety, this information is presented to provide a foundation for
understanding the fact that different types of the same selection assessment can lead to
varying and perhaps inconsistent results. The aim of the current study is to apply the
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distinction between overt and personality-based assessments to the safety literature. This
application is a novel extension of this body of research, as no one to date has attempted
to investigate the effect that this distinction has for the selection of safety-prone
individuals.
Therefore, the current study includes three personality constructs that have been
consistently linked to safety outcomes. An assessment of these personality constructs will
be compared to overt safety questions to investigate the predictive validity of each type.
The following section will detail the three individual differences in personality traits that
are thought to be especially relevant to the selection of employees who are predisposed to
safe behavior. Additional information regarding the creation and distinction between this
type of measure compared to an overt measure of safety will be provided in the Method
section.
Personality- Based Safety Assessment
Individual differences have long been recognized as important predictors of
workplace behavior and attitudes (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Judge et al., 2002). In fact,
individual differences in propensity to behave safely on the job were some of the first
variables to be examined as predictors of occupational accidents and injuries. Researchers
have been investigating “accident-prone” individuals as early as 1918 (Vernon, 1918) in
an attempt to predict who will be involved in safety-related workplace incidents.
Individual differences that have been linked to safety-related outcomes include
personality characteristics, values, attitudes, and beliefs, indicating that certain employees
have a greater likelihood to be involved in workplace accidents and injuries (Forcier et
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al., 2001). Forcier and colleagues (2001) emphasized the fact that personality differences
can help explain the occurrence of workplace accidents has important implications for
workplaces, noting the measurement of these differences facilitates more knowledgeable
hiring and placement decisions.
Personality characteristics that have been examined in conjunction with safetyrelated outcomes include the Big Five and Type A behavior (Henning et al., 2008),
impulsivity, aggression, social maladjustment (Hansen, 1991), and regulatory focus (i.e.
prevention and promotion; Wallace & Chen, 2006). The present review examines three
personality constructs that have been consistently linked to safety outcomes:
conscientiousness, safety locus of control, and risk propensity. These constructs were
chosen not only due to their comparatively consistent relationships with safety but also
based on relevance, as specific tendencies should interact specifically with safety-related
situations to guide behavior (McCrae & Costa, 1996). As such, the present study
hypothesizes that these personality traits will operate through safety performance to
affect safety outcomes such as accidents, injuries, and missed days at work. Each of the
personality characteristics of interest will be reviewed below.
Conscientiousness. Conscientious people are characterized by tendencies towards
achievement and responsibility or dependability (Hough, 1992; Mount & Barrick, 1995).
Those who score highly on measures of this construct tend to be trustworthy, thorough,
and dutiful (Hogan & Ones, 1997). The very nature of this personality trait provides
intuitive reasoning why it would be linked to safety behavior (Wallace & Chen, 2006).
Firstly, conscientious employees have a tendency towards acting responsibly, which
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makes them more likely to follow rules, including safety-related rules. This inclination
may be especially strong given that conscientious individuals are also more likely to be
cautious in nature and careful to avoid mistakes (Costa & McCrae 1992; Goldberg,
1999). Conscientious people are also more aware of how they should behave in any given
environment, meaning they are more likely to tailor their actions to meet safety
expectations (Burke & Signal 2010; Henning et al., 2009). They are also more likely to
set and strive towards goals, which may be why the personality trait has been linked to
safety motivation (Griffin, Burley, & Neal, 2000).
Research has generally supported the conscientiousness-safety link, yet the
correlation is often modest in magnitude. For example, Christian et al. (2009) conducted
a meta-analysis to examine the person-related and situation-related factors that affect
workplace safety, and found conscientiousness to have a weak relationship to safety
performance (Mρ= .18) and a slightly stronger relationship with safety outcomes (Mρ =
.26). Another meta-analysis found a corrected mean validity coefficient of .31 between
conscientiousness and accident involvement (Clarke & Robertson, 2008).
Wallace and Chen (2006) stated that the research surrounding conscientiousness
as a positive predictor of safety was promising but pointed out that other research had
found conflicting results. However, the authors noted that various mediating processes
could be the root of the divergent relationship between this personality trait and safety.
Burke and Signal (2010) echoed this notion, stating that the generally weak relationships
conscientiousness has with safety outcomes could be attributed to the fact that safety
motivation is theorized as the mechanism through which the conscientiousness – safety
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performance and outcome relationships operate. This is aligned with the fact that distal
antecedents typically exhibit weaker relationships with outcomes than proximal ones
(Christian et al., 2009). Although the current study does not include safety motivation as
a mediator, the factors of safety compliance and participation are included as potential
mechanisms through which the conscientiousness-safety outcomes relationships operate.
Risk propensity. The tendency for an individual to take risks is another construct
that has gained notable attention in the prediction of safety behavior, and is known as risk
propensity or risk avoidance. Although some claim this trait is a combination of various
Big Five traits (e.g., Nicholson, Soane, Fenton- O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005), the
majority of researchers consider this construct to be based on Zuckerman’s (1971, 1979)
theory of sensation-seeking. Sensation-seeking is characterized by a need for excitement,
variety, and stimulation, along with a lack of inhibition and a desire to avoid boredom
(Forcier et al., 2001; Rosenbloom & Wolf, 2002). Risk avoidance, on the other hand, is
the lack of these sensation- seeking tendencies (Forcier et al., 2001).
As with conscientiousness, the nature of this trait sheds light on why individuals
characterized by the propensity to take risks would be more likely to be involved with a
safety incident at work. Christian et al. (2009) explained that risk-takers often behave
unsafely because they do not accurately assess their chances of being involved in an
accident or because they actually enjoy the stimulation associated with danger.
Individuals with a propensity to take risks also behave less cautiously and are more likely
to make decisions impulsively, without thinking through the consequences of behaving in
an unsafe manner (Henning et al., 2009). This is in contrast to high risk-avoidance
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employees, who do not require as much stimulation and may not take risks out of
boredom; furthermore, they are less bothered by highly structured environments, which
are more conducive to following safety rules (Forcier et al., 2001).
In alignment with this theory, risk propensity and sensation-seeking have been
linked to unsafe behavior and attitudes (e.g., Ulleberg and Rundmo, 2003; Hansen, 1989)
as well as various counterproductive behaviors such as drug and alcohol use on the job
(Jones, Britton, & Slora, 1988). Based on research such as this, Christian et al. (2009)
hypothesized that risk-taking would be related to safety performance (i.e. safety
compliance and participation) as well as safety outcomes (i.e., accidents and injuries) to a
weaker degree. The results of their meta-analysis partially supported their hypothesis, as
risk-taking behavior was related to safety performance (Mρ = .28) but not to the more
distal safety outcomes.
Locus of control. Locus of control (LOC) is another individual difference that
has been consistently examined in conjunction with safety-related outcomes. In fact, the
theory of internal-external locus of control, first developed by Rotter (1966), was among
the first psychological constructs investigated as a possible antecedent of accident
potential (Janicak, 1996). Internal locus of control is characterized by the perception that
one is generally in command of life’s events, as compared to external locus of control,
which attributes this power to the environment or fate (Judge et al., 2003; Judge, Locke,
Durham, & Kluger, 1998). This predisposition can affect how an individual behaves
across a variety of situations (Connoly, 1980).
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This personality trait is theorized to be linked to safety outcomes because,
similarly to risk-propensity, people characterized by a fatalistic perspective have been
demonstrated to underestimate the likelihood that they will be involved in an accident
(Kouabenan, 1998), which could lead these individuals to take fewer precautions.
Christian et al. (2009) explained that those who believe they can control what happens to
them may be more likely to engage in safety training and behaviors than those who do
not share these beliefs, as they likely think this can help them avoid safety issues. This is
in contrast to people with fatalistic or external LOC views, who are more likely to believe
their actions will not influence whether an accident occurs or not, especially because they
don’t believe themselves to be direct contributors to accidents in the first place (Henning
et al., 2009). The authors’ hypothesis was confirmed by their meta-analysis, which
demonstrated that locus of control had a significant relationship with safety performance
(Mρ = .35) as well as safety outcomes (Mρ = .26). Burke and Signal (2010) summarized
that locus of control as a predictor of safety behavior and accident involvement has
"important implications for worker selection and training" (p. 20).
Despite a growing evidence for the LOC- safety relationship, Neal and Griffin
(2004) point out that results pertaining to this construct are still mixed, because while
some authors have found that internal LOC is more advantageous for accident/injury
prevention, other researchers argue that external LOC is the better predictor. However,
this could be due to the fact that locus of control is too broad of a construct, and that
specifying this trait in terms of safety could create more consistent results. The construct
of safety locus of control has received less attention in the safety literature but could
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likely be a more reliable predictor due to a match in specificity of constructs, which
strengthens predictor-criterion relationships. Forcier et al. (2001) explained that the safety
LOC scale is better suited to the work environment because it has a higher degree of face
validity due to the fact that it refers specifically to safe work behaviors.
Safety locus of control. Safety locus of control is based on the same underlying
theory as LOC but refers to an individual’s perception of his or her ability to control his
or her life events pertaining specifically to workplace safety (Jones & Wuebker, 1985).
Namely, an employee who scores high on measures of internal safety LOC feels a sense
of personal responsibility for their safety, whereas their external LOC counterpart does
not. This has clear implications for a person’s likelihood of being involved in a
workplace accident because someone who feels responsible for safety is more likely to
take preventative steps to avoid involvement in a safety incident, since they believe the
occurrence of accidents and injuries is contingent on their behavior. Instead, externallycontrolled individuals neither believe their actions to be directly linked to safety incidents
nor that they have the power to control them anyway (Jones & Weubker, 1993; Forcier et
al., 2001). Rather, these individuals “tend to perceive that accidents and injuries are
determined by forces outside their control, such as chance events, bad luck, or negligent
management practices" (Jones & Wuebker, 1993, p. 450). This not only places the
employees at a greater risk but exposes their coworkers to danger as well, as an external
safety LOC employee is less inclined to take precautions to create a safe work
environment the way an internal safety LOC employee would (Forcier et al., 2001).
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Individuals with higher internal safety LOC scores have been found to have better
safety records than their lower internal (i.e., external) safety LOC counterparts in a
variety of industries, and are involved in fewer accidents and injuries at work (Jones and
Wuebker, 1993, Forcier et al., 2001). Jones and Wuebker (1993) conducted a study with
the goal to establish the criterion-oriented validity of their Safety LOC scale. The authors
administered their scale to 283 hospital workers, who also completed self-report
assessments of on-the-job accidents and injuries, including the frequency, type, and
estimated cost of the incident. The results suggested that the more external safety LOC
employees not only had more frequent injuries than the internal safety LOC employees,
but the injuries were more severe and costly as well.
Similarly, Jones and Wuebker conducted another study in 1985 that showed that
employees’ history of accident severity was linked to holding external safety beliefs
(Jones & Wuebker, 1985). High-risk drivers have also been shown to have more external
safety LOC tendencies (Jones & Foreman, 1984). Furthermore, measures of safety LOC
have been found to be related to counterproductive behaviors, with external safety LOC
individuals reporting more dishonesty, violence, and drug use potential (Wuebker, 1987).
Wuebker (1987) concluded that these employees are likely more at risk for breaking
rules, damaging property, and substance use on the job in addition to exhibiting poorer
safety behaviors.
Based on research such as this, safety locus of control, along with
conscientiousness and risk propensity, are included in the personality-based safety
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assessment. The following section clarifies how overt integrity measures will be applied
to the safety domain in the current study.
Overt Safety Assessment
Some organizations have attempted to use more direct methods to predict safety
behavior on the job. This may appear in the form of outright questions about whether the
employee follows safety rules (known from here on as overt self-report format). The
items could also be presented in a situational judgment type format, which is
characterized by presenting the applicant with a hypothetical scenario and requiring the
best course of action from a list of options to be chosen (Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett,
2005). Lievens et al. (2005) summarized that situational judgment tests (SJTs) have
become increasingly popular due to evidence suggesting their criterion-related validity,
high face validity, and minimal adverse impact against minorities are superior compared
to cognitive ability tests.
The present study will use both forms of questions to create a more
comprehensive overt safety assessment. Despite the increased concern over safety and the
fact that pre-employment measures have been linked to reduction in work-related
accidents (e.g., Borofsky, Wagner, & Turner, 1995), there was little research specific to
safety to draw from to guide the creation of these items. Therefore, the present study
applies the characteristics of overt integrity tests to create an overt safety measure.
Namely, applicants will report their beliefs and behavior regarding on-the-job safety. As
with any overt integrity measure, the purpose of this assessment is to use this information
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to estimate the applicant’s inclination towards future behaviors of this type. Information
about the measures will be provided in greater detail in the Method section.
The Emergence of Personality in Strong and Weak Situations
Although it is hypothesized that both personality-based and overt safety selection
measures will be related to safety performance, it is unlikely that this relationship will be
uniform across safety climates. Specifically, the strength of the safety climate at both the
group and organization level is likely to impact the relationship that safety selection
measures have with safety performance. This hypothesis is based on the concept of
situational strength, which is formally defined as “implicit or explicit cues provided by
external entities regarding the desirability of potential behaviors” (Meyer, Dalal, &
Hermida, 2009, p. 22). In other words, the characteristics of a given situation can inhibit
the expression of employees’ individual differences (Snyder & Ickes, 1985; Weiss &
Adler, 1984). These characteristics determine the strength of the situation: a situation is
considered “strong” when there is clarity about informational cues and behavioral
expectations; incentives to comply and the ability to meet the situation’s demands also
increase its strength (Mischel, 1977; Weiss & Adler, 1984).
Individuals are said to be more likely to follow their behavioral inclinations in
weak situations because their personal tendencies provide them with accessible
information about how to respond in a given situation in the absence of environmental
cues (Mischel & Peake, 1982). In a strong situation, where many cues provide
information about how to behave, individual discretion becomes less salient, creating
behavioral homogeneity among a group of people (Hattrup & Jackson, 1996; Meyer,
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Dalal & Bonaccio, 2009; Mischel, 1977). In short, a strong situation is classified as one
where there is little ambiguity, whereas a weak situation has more uncertainty. As
previously stated, stronger climates produce more consistent behavior because there is
greater agreement about what behavior is appropriate. People also have greater alignment
in their expectations as well as how they perceive events, creating psychological pressure
to behave in a manner consistent with these expectations. These conditions are in contrast
to those that comprise a weak climate, where these expectancies about how to behave do
not exist or are inconsistent due to a lack of clear incentives, support, or behavioral
expectations (Beaty, Cleveland, & Murphy, 2001; González-Romá et al., 2002; Luria,
2008; Meyer et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2002).
A strong organizational climate has been suggested to be a good example of a
strong situation, because strong organizations are characterized by employee consensus
regarding desired and expected behaviors (Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirat, 2002). The
concept of strong versus weak situations, or in this case, safety climate, is especially
pertinent to this study because the strength of a situation can impact the expression of
personality. Namely, strong situations elicit uniform behavior, whereas weak situations
should result in a greater variability in behavioral responses (Mischel, 1973, 1976;
Schneider et al., 2002). The latter allows for greater expression of personality, because
employees rely on their predispositions to dictate appropriate behavior since the situation
is not specifying it (Beaty et al., 2001). This theory has been strengthened by studies that
have found the relationship between personality and outcomes to vary according to the
strength of the situation (e.g., Beaty et al., 2001). Furthermore, personality traits have
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been suggested to be stronger predictors of outcomes when climates are less restrictive
(James, Demaree, Mulaik, & Ladd, 1992). Research demonstrating the moderating role of
situational strength on personality- behavior outcomes is detailed below.
Smithikrai (2008) conducted a study in which 612 Thai employees of government
or private sector organizations participated. Employees completed self-report measures of
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and counterproductive work behaviors (CWB);
situational strength was evaluated through employee assessments of group norms
regarding CWB and performance monitoring (the observation of employees’ workrelated behaviors). The author found CWB to be significantly more prevalent in weaker
situations. Furthermore, the relationships that the personality traits of agreeableness and
conscientiousness had with CWB were amplified in weaker situations. The differences
between the correlations in the strong versus weak situations were significant, as the
average correlation between CWB and the personality traits was -.28 in the strong
situation and -.54 in the weak situation.
Withey, Gellatly, and Anneti (2005) also found some evidence to support
situational strength as a moderator of personality-behavior relationships. A sample of 418
undergraduate students were placed in situations designed to be strong or weak, where
situational strength was manipulated by describing the scenario in vary degrees of
ambiguity. The authors examined differences in self-reported effort provision, which was
the students’ likelihood to expend effort to help an organization with hypothetical
problems. The authors found self-reported Big Five personality traits to have a stronger
relationship with intention to expend effort in the weaker scenario (average correlation in
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the weak situation was .24, compared to .14 in the strong situation), which confirmed
their hypothesis. The differences in correlation coefficients reached statistical
significance for emotional stability and conscientiousness. Moreover, effort intentions
differed according to levels of emotional stability, but only when the situation was weak.
Another study demonstrated the role that situation strength can play in the
predictive ability of conscientiousness. Meyer, Dalal, and Bonaccio (2009) conducted a
meta-analysis that included 162 independent correlations and a total of 34,659
participants in an effort to examine the relationship between conscientiousness and job
performance. The results suggested global situational strength moderates the relationship
between conscientiousness and both overall performance (β = -.26) and task performance
(β = -.22), where stronger situations weaken the relationship between personality and
performance. The authors estimated uncorrected correlations between conscientiousness
and performance to range from r = .09 to .23 for overall performance and r = .06 to .18
for task performance, where correlations become stronger in occupations whose
environment is typically weaker.
The Present Study and Integration of Hypotheses
The present study applies the personality-based versus overt distinction from the
integrity test literature to safety for the purposes of selection. Because this is a novel
approach, no specific hypotheses can be made in confidence regarding which type of
measure will be a stronger predictor of the outcomes of interest. However, both types are
expected to predict objective (e.g., work days missed, restricted work days) and
subjective (e.g., near miss, musculoskeletal pain) safety outcomes. This is because
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individual differences in the personality traits of conscientiousness, risk propensity, and
safety locus of control have all been predictive of safety-related outcomes in prior
research. Furthermore, beliefs and reports of past behavior (i.e., overt measures) have
been linked to related outcomes in integrity research; therefore, it is anticipated that this
pattern will be replicated with safety-related variables.
However, these relationships are expected to be mediated by safety performance
(compliance and participation) due to the fact that safety performance is frequently
identified as a direct antecedent of safety outcomes (e.g., Neal & Griffin, 2004). The
hypothesized relationships are in alignment with the expectation that safety performance
will be more influenced by proximal antecedents than distal antecedents (Christian et al.,
2009) and in keeping with the many studies that have found safety performance to
mediate predictor-safety outcome relationships. Therefore, the following hypotheses are
proposed:
1a) The positive relationships between conscientiousness and safety
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance.
1b) The positive relationships between risk propensity and safety
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance.
1c) The positive relationships between safety locus of control and safety
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance.
2a) The positive relationships between self-reported safety behavior (SJT
format) and safety outcomes will be mediated by safety performance.
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2b) The positive relationships between self-reported safety behavior (selfreport format) and safety outcomes will be mediated by safety
performance.
The relationships that personality-based and overt safety selection measures are
expected to have with safety performance are also hypothesized to vary across safety
climates. Strong situations (i.e., climates) should diminish variability in behavioral
responses and expression of personality (Beaty et al., 2001; Mischel, 1973, 1976;
Schneider et al., 2002). Therefore, greater group-level safety climate strength is
anticipated to weaken the relationship between the safety selection measures and safety
performance. Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed:
3a) The conscientiousness - safety performance relationship will be
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the
relationship between conscientiousness and safety performance will be
weaker when safety climate is stronger.
3b) The risk propensity - safety performance relationship will be
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the
relationship between risk propensity and safety performance will be
weaker when safety climate is stronger.
3c) The safety locus of control - safety performance relationship will be
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the
relationship between safety locus of control and safety performance will
be weaker when safety climate is stronger.

53

4a) The safety self-reported safety behavior (SJT format) - safety
performance relationship will be moderated by group-level safety climate
strength, such that the relationship between self-reported safety behavior
(SJT format) and safety performance will be weaker when safety climate
is stronger.
4b) The safety self-reported safety behavior (self-report format) - safety
performance relationship will be moderated by group-level safety climate
strength, such that the relationship between self-reported safety behavior
(self-report format) and safety performance will be weaker when safety
climate is stronger.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHOD

Participants and Rationale for Inclusion
Participants in the current study included both applicants and employees of a
grocery store chain located across eight states in the Southeastern United States. The
company owns and operates 206 retail stores and employs approximately 24,000
employees. Retail trade comprises the second highest United States industry sector in
terms of employment (Bureau of National Labor Statistics (BLS), 2010). This industry is
not only populous but can also be dangerous, with 4.1 recordable injuries and illnesses
for every 100 workers, and 302 fatalities in 2010 (BLS, 2010). Many such injuries result
from ergonomic issues, such lifting heavy objects, or hazardous conditions, such as
walking on slippery floors (Sinclair, Martin, & Sears, 2010). In fact, counter to the
common notion that retail work is safe, the wholesale and retail trade accounted for
20.1% of nonfatal injuries and illnesses of the private sector in 2006, despite the fact that
it comprised only 15.5% of the worker population at that time (Anderson et al.,
2010).Using data from the BLS in 2006, Anderson et al. (2010) reported that the retail
sector was most often exposed or engaged in incidents involving overexertion, followed
by contact with objects/equipment, and falls.
Anderson et al. (2010) cited Leigh et al.’s (2004) calculations of total costs for
fatal and nonfatal injuries, showing grocery stores to have the highest cost for such
incidents out of the eight top-ranking retail sectors, at $2.7 billion dollars. The authors
also cited estimations by Zalonshnja et al. (2006) indicating that prevention of incidents
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of this nature could save organizations in the long run, calculating for retail trade, a 35%
reduction in injuries in the retail trade would save $3.07 billion dollars. Thus, the use of
retail workers is appropriate for the purpose of prevention of accidents and injuries,
which are both frequent and costly.
In the present study, 20,470 applicants completed the pre-employment
assessments between March 1, 2012 and April 30, 2012. Of those, 1,188 were hired for
positions (5.8%). A total of 197 (16.5%) of these newly hired employees completed the
employee opinion survey administered in June, 2012. These participants, (referred to in
the remainder of the text as “matched participants,” are the sample used for the majority
of analyses.
The largest percentage of matched participants ranged in age from 20 to 24
(26.9%, n = 53) followed by the Under 20 age range (22.3%, n = 44). The remainder of
the participants were 25 or over (50.8%, n = 100). The sample consisted of 87 males
(44.2%) and 110 females (55.8%). Most employees were White / Caucasian (64.0%, n =
126) or Black / African American (26.4%, n = 52). Most of the employees worked in the
front end of the store (53.8%, n = 106), consisting of 94 cashiers (47.7%), 10 baggers
(5.1%), one customer service associate (0.5%) and one accounting associate (0.5%).
More than two-thirds of employees were part-time associates (68.0%, n = 134). All
matched participants had less than four months’ tenure, as they had all been hired
between March 11, 2012 and May 1, 2013. See Table 9 for complete demographic
information on matched participants.
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Procedure
Measures of personality-based and overt safety related items were added to the
store’s current pre-employment assessment for the purpose of the current study. Although
they were originally supposed to be introduced in November 1, 2011, logistical issues
delayed their inclusion until March 1, 2012. Applicants completed all items online using
an applicant tracking system managed by a large talent management solutions company.
Individuals who completed the store’s computer-based pre-employment application and
questionnaire also completed the safety-related questions. These items were not used to
screen out any applicants and were gathered solely for research purposes. Accident and
injury data was collected from the corporate headquarters’ safety records for the period of
time spanning March 1, 2012 until December 31, 2012. The responses of applicants who
were selected for employment were linked to their safety records to investigate the
individual-level relationship between the pre-employment safety items (both personalitybased and overt) and subsequent safety outcomes using a unique employee identifier.
The span of time over which accident and injury data was collected for the present
study was approximately ten months. This length of time was appropriate because it was
long enough to accumulate accident and injury data, which are low base-rate events, but
short enough such that extreme changes that would affect the safety climate are not
expected to occur during that time (e.g., change in technology or work procedures). The
argument for a relatively short time span for collecting this data was supported by
findings from Beus et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis, which reported that safety climateinjury effect sizes decreased as the length of time over which outcome data was collected
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increased. Ten months is also within the time frames for injury assessment established by
previous studies, which have ranged from three months (e.g., Hofmann & Mark, 2006) to
the entire length of an employees’ organizational tenure (e.g., Clark, 2006b). Lastly, it the
likelihood of detecting significant effects may actually be increased by limiting the time
frame of the study, as mounting evidence indicates that newer employees are far more
likely to file a workers’ compensation claim than their more tenured counterparts (e.g.,
Smith et al., 1999). In fact, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1982) reported that workers
with one month of tenure were three times more likely to be hurt than their counterparts
with nine months of tenure.
Next, all retail employees completed their annual employee survey between June
13 and July 4, 2012, administered by a third-party employee opinion survey company, on
a voluntary basis. Only applicants hired before May 1, 2012 were eligible to participate in
the employee survey. Measures of safety climate, safety compliance and participation,
and self-reported safety behaviors were included in the employee survey. This enabled an
investigation of the hypotheses proposed by the full model; namely, whether safety
compliance and participation mediates the relationship between the pre-employment
safety items and safety outcomes, and whether safety climate strength moderates the
relationship between the safety selection items and the participation and/or compliance.
Measures
Demographic information. Individuals who applied to any job at the grocery
store chain were required to input their date of birth (i.e., age). Additional data was
obtained from applicants who were selected for employment, including race and gender.
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This information, along with date of hire (i.e., tenure), department, and store, was
included in the accident and injury data obtained from the grocery chain’s corporate
records. A department-within-store variable was created to distinguish between units
when computing variables at the group level.
Applicant measures. All measures for selection purposes were a combination of
items created or modified for the current study along with items the grocery store chain
was already using. Existing items were combined with items that were added for the
current study based on response option; namely, Likert-type items were combined to
form a single scale and items with other response formats were combined to form a single
scale). All non-Likert-type items were rationally scored by subject matter experts.
Specifically, a numerical value was of five was assigned to the best response, four for the
second best response, etc., with the lowest response option assigned a value of one point.
Items of this nature included situational judgment items, items with numerical response
formats and other continuous items with varying response formats. The full measures can
be viewed in Tables 1 - 7; these tables also indicate the source of the items that were
derived from extant research.
Personality-based safety items. Assessments of conscientiousness, risk
propensity, and safety locus of control were included to investigate whether measures of
these constructs could predict safety outcomes. A series of items were created or
modified based on existing research for inclusion.
Conscientiousness. Five Conscientiousness items originating from John and
Srivastava’s (1999) Big Five Inventory (BFI) subscale of the same name. In order to
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increase variability in answers and elicit truthful responses, the stem “I see myself as
someone who…” was changed to “Others would say…” Examples include “I do a
thorough job” and “I am a reliable worker.” Participants indicated their extent of
agreement with the items on a five-point scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to
Strongly Agree. Higher scores are indicative of a greater inclination towards
conscientiousness. Empirical research has demonstrated that the BFI maintains
acceptable psychometric properties even when reduced to a quarter of its original items
(Rammstedt & John, 2007).
The grocery chain’s existing assessment contained seven conscientiousness items
with non-Likert-type response formats. The existing items presented employees with a
scenario or description; participants were then required to select the best choice or the
response that best describes him/her to the question from five options. Example items
include “How would others rate the quality of your work?” and “Compared to others,
how thoroughly do you clean?” These items were designed to assess whether the
respondent chooses a response that is aligned with a conscientious personality.
Risk propensity. Risk propensity was assessed using modified versions of three
items from Westaby and Lowe’s (2009) Risk Taking Orientation at Work scale and two
items from Meertens et al.’s (2008) Risk Propensity scale. A sample item from the former
scale is “I'd rather be a risk-taker than overly cautious” and a sample item from the latter
scale is “I usually view risks as a challenge.” Original response options were changed so
that all items were responded to on a five- point Likert-type scale ranging from Strongly
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Disagree to Strongly Agree. Four items were reverse scored so that lower scores indicate
a greater propensity to take risks.
Three additional items that assessed risk propensity were currently in the preemployment assessment distributed by the talent management company. These items
were rationally scored and evaluated as a separate scale.
Safety locus of control. Safety Locus of Control (SLOC) items were modified
from two items from Jones and Wuebker’s (1985) scale of the same name as well as four
items from Janicak’s (1996) Accident Locus of Control measure. A sample SLOC item
modified from Jones and Wuebker’s (1985) SLOC scale is “Avoiding accidents at work
is a matter of having good luck.” A sample item modified from Janicak’s (1996)
Accident LOC measure is “It is hard to have control over the things that cause accidents
at work.” Original response formats of the scales were changed such that all items would
be measured on a five-point scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. All
SLOC questions were designed to tap the individual’s perception of their ability to
control his or her life events pertaining specifically to workplace safety (Jones &
Wuebker, 1985; 1993). Four of the items were reverse scored so that higher values
indicate a more internal locus of control.
The predictive validity of the Safety Locus of Control scale was shown by Jones
and Wuebker (1985), who demonstrated that participants’ accident severity history was
linked to more external safety beliefs. Logistic regression analyses reported in Janicak’s
(1996) study designed to investigate the predictive validity of his Accident Locus of
Control measure suggested that the scale accurately predicted accident involvement for
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86% of cases. Split-half reliability estimates for both scales have also been of adequate
magnitude, with a reliability coefficient of .85 for the Safety Locus of Control Scale
(Jones & Wuebker, 1985) and .69 for the Accident Locus of Control Scale (Janicak,
1992).
Two rationally-scored items were provided by the talent management company to
be added to the selection system which required the applicant to choose the best option
from a list of five choices. These items were designed to assess whether the applicant
accepts responsibility for safe working practices and items were analyzed as a separate
scale. A sample item is, “Who is responsible for ensuring that safe work practices are
followed?”
Overt safety items. As with the personality items, overt safety items were either
Likert-type items on a five-point scale, or were rationally scored items with varying
response formats. The first four items were the Likert-type items and were created for the
current study; these items were designed to measure the applicant’s beliefs regarding
safety as well as their previous safety behavior, which is in line with overt integrity
measures. Two items were reverse scored such that higher scores indicate a greater
awareness of safety and inclination to engage in safe behavior. The questions asked
participants to indicate their agreement to the statements on a five-point scale ranging
from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. The first item, “I follow safety rules with few
reminders,” addresses admissions of safety, similarly to the way the London House
Personnel Selection Inventory’s (PSI) honesty scale, an overt integrity test, asked
applicants about theft admissions (Frost & Rafilson, 1989). The second item, “I believe in
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‘safety first’" aimed to examine applicants’ attitudes towards safety, similar to the way
the Reid Integrity test, another well-known overt integrity test, assesses applicants’
attitudes towards honesty and other integrity-related behaviors, such as theft and drug use
(Mumford et al., 2001). The third and fourth items “I don't believe the same safety rules
apply to everyone” and “I believe it's acceptable to bend or break safety rules if no one
will get hurt” attempt to determine the applicants’ acceptance of common rationalizations
about safety (Frost & Rafilson, 1989). Acceptance of rationalizations and beliefs about
others’ behaviors are two additional approaches used by the PSI to gauge safety.
The second set of four overt items were created in a situational-judgment type
question format, where the applicant was given a scenario and was then required to
choose the best of five options presented. A sample item of this format is “You see a
coworker breaking a safety rule. What would you do?” For this example, the response
that would receive the lowest score is “Nothing” and the response that would receive the
highest score is “Immediately approach the employee to tell him/her that a safety rule is
being broken.” This final set of items were rationally scored and combined to form a
single scale.
Employee measures. Measures completed by all employees during the annual
survey administered in June 2012 included a safety climate assessment, safety
compliance and participation scales, and three items for participants to report safety
outcomes. Because the safety items were a new addition to the yearly survey that the
grocery retail employees complete, an introduction to these items explained their
inclusion:
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[Store name] cares about each and every one of its associates, and
our goal is to maintain a safe and healthy environment for you to
work and shop. To help us attain that goal, we have added
questions to this year’s survey about safety at [store name]. We
are looking to you, our associates, to provide insight into your
work environment. Answering the questions honestly will help is
identify areas that we can improve upon and areas in which we are
already succeeding. By providing your opinion about safety issues
at [store name], you can help us strive for an accident- and injuryfree workplace.
Safety climate strength. Items from Zohar and Luria’s (2005) safety climate scale
were used to measure this construct. In the original version, this scale contains 32
different items, 16 of which measure organization-level safety climate and 16 of which
measure group-level safety climate. In the current study, nine of the original 16 grouplevel items were used and two of the original organization-level items were included. A
final change to this scale was in the stem of the items. In order to assess group-level
safety climate, “My direct supervisor” was changed to “My department manager.” This
change was instituted to reduce ambiguity regarding to which manager the items referred.
Items were chosen based on their relevance to the current sample with the
rationale that any question that was not applicable to the current sample would have little
variability and detract from the measure’s reliability. Items were also selected based on
how actionable they were to the client; because the grocery store company intended to
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use this information for promotion eligibility, it would have been unfair to assign low
safety ratings to a manager for a work aspect that he or she has no control over. Lastly,
this number of questions was included so that the entire domain of safety climate could
be assessed while maintaining parsimony of measurement.
Participants indicated the extent of their agreement with these statements on a
five-point scale (reduced from the original seven-point scale) ranging from Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree. In accordance with the recommendations of Schneider et al.
(2002), group-level climate strength was calculated by examining the standard deviation
of each group’s average safety climate perceptions (Zohar & Luria, 2005). A lower
standard deviation indicates a higher strength of climate because it reflects a lesser degree
of variability in perceptions.
As detailed earlier, climate perceptions inherently form into levels because
although policies and procedures are created at the organization-level, they are
implemented at the unit level, allowing for variability as a result of individual supervisors
that manage each unit (Zohar, 2000). Zohar (2006) emphasized that this process
necessitates the separate measurement, aggregation, and scoring of safety climate
perceptions at the level of interest. Separating items from different levels should help
reduce level discrepancy errors (Zohar, 2010) and can prevent the distortion of results
interpretations (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996). The current study was focused on the safety
climate strength as a group-level construct.
Zohar and Luria’s (2005) Multilevel Safety Climate (MSC) measure was
originally conceptualized as having three sub-scales: Active Practices (Monitoring–
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Controlling), Proactive Practices (Instructing–Guiding), and Declarative Practices
(Declaring–Informing). However, a single-factor structure will be employed for the
present study. Johnson (2007) used structural equation modeling to determine that a
single-factor structure also provides adequate fit to the data; moreover, the three
dimensions were highly correlated in the author’s study, suggesting that they are all
ultimately tapping the same construct. In fact, Zohar and Luria (2005) used a single
global factor for safety climate, based on numerous cross- loadings of items as well as
high inter-correlations among the factors.
The present study aims to operationalize group-level safety climate (and its
standard deviation, safety climate strength) as a unidimensional factor on the basis of this
research. Furthermore, all three original subscales are concerned with management
practices and nearly all safety climate measures have a management component, which is
the focus of the present paper. Additional support for using a single management-focused
factor was garnered from a study conducted by Beus et al. (2010) who found that
“perceived management commitment to safety is the most robust predictor of
occupational injuries” (p. 713). Lastly, as previously mentioned, the purpose of the safety
climate assessment should be the determining factor in whether a higher-order factor is
more appropriate than precise first-order factors (Griffin & Neal, 2000); a single-factor
construct focusing on management practices as a whole was the best option given the
present model and proposed study.
Numerous studies have provided support for the reliability and validity of Zohar
and Luria’s (2005) MSC; this assessment exhibited significant relationships with safety
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behavior as well as injury frequency/ severity rates (Johnson, 2007). Zohar and Luria
(2005) reported a Cronbach alpha of .95. Johnson (2007) also demonstrated that multiple
items can be removed from the scale while maintaining the integrity of the measure.
Safety compliance and participation. Three items each were used to assess safety
compliance and safety participation. These questions were selected from multiple sources
in order to maximize the relevance of each item to the current sample. Participants
indicated their agreement with all items on a five point scale ranging from strongly
disagree to strongly agree.
Two safety compliance items were drawn from Neal and Griffin’s (2004) scale.
The items are: “I use all the necessary safety equipment to do my job” and “I use the
correct safety procedures for carrying out my job.” The third safety compliance item was
modified from Vinodkumar and Bhasi’s scale (2010): “I carry out my work in a safe
manner.”
Vinodkumar and Bhasi’s (2010), measures of safety compliance and safety
participation have demonstrated sufficient reliability coefficients (alpha = .76 and .66,
respectively) and had positive relationships with safety knowledge and safety motivation.
Neal and Griffin’s (2004) safety compliance and participation scales have consistently
demonstrated high reliability coefficients as well as significant relationships with
accidents at the group level (e.g., Neal & Griffin, 2006).
One safety participation item was from Neal and Griffin’s (2004) scale, and read,
“I put in extra effort to improve the safety of the workplace.” The second item was
modified from Vinodkumar and Bhasi’s (2010) measure, which was, “I point out to
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management any safety related matters that I notice.” Lastly, the third item was from the
helping subscale of Hofmann et al.’s safety citizenship measure, and stated, “I assist
others to make sure they perform their work safely.” Hofmann et al.’s (2003) study
provided evidence for a safety citizenship – safety climate relationship.
Safety outcomes. Safety outcomes were measured by both objective data
collected from the grocery store company’s corporate headquarters as well as subjective
data self-reported by the participant.
Objective outcomes. Objective data was gathered from the grocery store’s
corporate records, and included work days missed due to an injury as well as restricted
days due to an injury. Restricted days refer to work days when the injured employee
could come to work but may not complete the full range of tasks or length of hours he or
she would typically perform. Records that indicate that a worker suffered an injury but
did not miss any days of work were classified as micro-accident data, which refers to
minor injuries that require medical attention but do not require lost workdays,
differentiating micro-accidents from ordinary accidents (Zohar, 2000). The microaccident outcome was computed as a dichotomous outcome where an employee had a
recorded accident/injury but did not miss any work days afterwards.
Micro-accidents are increasingly being incorporated into safety research to
address some of the measurement difficulties associated with using accidents or
reportable injuries as outcome measures. Namely, the fact that that accidents and injuries
are statistically rare events suggests that they may not be able to adequately tap the more
subtle nuances of safety that occur at the unit level (Lingard, Cooke, & Blismas, 2010).
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Furthermore micro-accidents are less likely to present skewed distributions because they
occur much more often, while maintaining the benefits associated with objective
measures of safety (Christian et al., 2009; Zohar, 2000). Lastly, micro-accidents exhibit a
strong relationship with lost-days accidents and take much less time to accumulate in
sufficient quantity (Christian et al., 2009; Zohar, 2000).
Self-reported outcomes. Self-reported questions used to measure subjective
outcomes included a near-miss item, which asks about the frequency of occurrences of
on-the-job incidents in the past year that could have resulted in an injury but did not. This
item was modified from Goldenhar, Williams, and Swanson (2003); applicants chose one
of five responses, ranging from “Zero” to “Seven or More.” Goldenhar et al.’s (2003)
near-miss item has been positively linked to self-reported injuries (r = .13, p < .05) and
negatively related to 5safety compliance (r = -.18, p < .01).
Similarly to micro-accident data, near-misses are increasingly being included in
safety research because they are closely associated with actual accident frequency
(Powell, Schechtman, & Riley, 2007) and have a higher base rate than actual accidents
and injuries found (Burke & Signal, 2010), increasing the chance that an effect will be
detected. In support of this hypothesis, a study by Probst (2004) found that safety
behavior exhibited a stronger relationship with near-misses than other safety outcomes.
A second self-report item asks participants to indicate how many times in the past
year a minor injury was suffered that did not require treatment. The item was modified
from a scale used in Sinclair et al. (2010), who found a negative relationship between
safety compliance and self-reported minor injuries. Minor, non-reportable injuries have
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been suggested as a more fine-grained measure of safety performance to use in
examining group safety climate – injury rate relationships (Zohar, 2000, 2002). This
suggestion is based on arguments similar to those in support of micro-accident outcome
variables, as an indicator of safety performance that occurs more frequently than serious
incidents is necessary to detect significant relationships (Hopkins, 2009).
Lastly, a final self-report question asked employees to indicate the number of
times musculoskeletal (MSK) pain was experienced in the past year at work. A
description of musculoskeletal symptoms was provided to ensure that each employee
understood the question and could determine whether he or she had experienced pain of
that nature. This question was added to ensure the issues most pertinent to the sample
were addressed. MSK pain results from repeated use and overextension of the muscles
and back, and comprises the bulk of injuries in retail workers (Campany & Personick,
1992). This item was modified from a scale used in Sinclair et al.’s (2010) study of labor
union members’ perceptions of safety climate in the retail industry; the authors’ measure
was based on ergonomic surveys of MSK pain. Sinclair et al. (2010) found a significant
relationship between their MSK measure and both self-reported near-miss (r = .25, p <
.05) and minor injuries (r = .18, p < .05).
In addition to the fact that the objective outcomes are low-frequency events, the
use of self-reported data is justifiable because results from a similar study suggested that
“common methods bias may not be a major concern in the safety domain;” furthermore,
if common method bias did exist, it would actually mean that studies underestimate
relationships where safety climate is the predictor due to range restriction caused by

70

underreporting of accident and injuries (Christian et al., 2009, p. 1122). Furthermore,
other studies found only negligible differences in self-reported safety performance ratings
compared to coworker and supervisor ratings (e.g., Burke et al., 2002). Lastly, reliability
coefficients in self-reported criteria have been found to be higher than external criteria in
numerous studies (e.g., Burke et al., 2002; McDaniel & Jones, 1988; Ones et al., 1993).
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 20.0 and EQS 6.1. Means,
standard deviations, individual-level inter-correlations and reliability coefficients are
displayed in Table 8. Demographics of the matched participants are available in Table 9.
Matched participants are those who completed the pre-employment measures, were hired,
and also completed the employee survey measures. Because only six of those individuals
also had a reported accident or injury, analyses could not be conducted exclusively on
those who had complete data, as the sample size was too low to provide reliable or
meaningful results. Specifically, the goal of the analyses was to determine whether the
predictors of interest could explain variance in accident/injury occurrence, but a sample
size of six does not provide sufficient variance to predict.
For the three personality variables, results of reliability statistics and confirmatory
factor analysis suggested the Likert-type format items and the rationally scored, SJT
format items (including items already in the pre-employment measures from the talent
management company) may not be measuring the same constructs as the Likert-type
format items (see Tables 10a-b). Thus, the decision was made to retain only the Likerttype format items for these scales (Safety Locus of Control items 1-6, Risk Propensity
items 1-5, and Conscientiousness items 1-5). Reliability analyses guided the removal of
one Safety Locus of Control item (“Preventing accidents in the workplace is the
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responsibility of the company.”) and one self-report Overt Safety item (“I don't believe
the same safety rules apply to everyone.”).
Individual-level inter-correlations. Individual-level correlations were examined
using the matched participants (see Table 8). The results suggested that all three
personality-based variables were significantly and positively related to each other, with
correlations ranging from .372 to .476 (p < .01). The two overt safety variables were not
significantly related to each other, but the self-report format overt safety items were
correlated with to all three personality variables. The SJT format overt safety variable
was related to missed work days (.968, p < .01). Safety climate average and strength were
also related to each other (-.147, p < .05), which provided additional support for Lindgard
et al.’s (2010) findings that stronger climates tended to be higher in valence (more
positive).
The three subjective safety outcomes were also related to each other, with
correlations rating from .227 (p < .01) to .318 (p < .01), suggesting that employees with
higher reports of one type of subjective safety outcome (e.g., near-misses) also have
higher reports of other types (e.g., work-related MSK pain). Some of the subjective safety
outcomes had significant relationships with objective safety outcomes. Specifically, the
missed work days variable was strongly correlated with reports of near-miss (.968, p <
.01) and MSK pain (.866, p < .01). This may provide some evidence that the less severe
subjective safety outcomes are precursors to the more severe objective safety outcomes.
This finding has been substantiated by previous studies; for example, Powell et al. (2006)
found drivers who reported at least one near-miss due to sleepiness were 1.13 times more
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likely to report having an actual driving accident, as compared with participants with no
near-miss reports.
All three personality variables were significantly and positively related to safety
performance (risk propensity = .176, p < .05; safety locus of control = .213, p < .01;
conscientiousness = .215, p < .01), indicating that individuals higher on these traits
reported more safety compliance and participation behaviors. Safety performance was
also related to group safety climate strength (.615, p < .01) and work-related MSK pain (.289, p < .01). Group-level safety climate strength was also significantly correlated with
missed work days (-.812, p < .05), suggesting that employees in groups with stronger
safety climates were less likely to miss work days due to an accident/injury.
Sample sizes. Personality measures (conscientiousness, risk propensity, and
safety locus of control) and overt safety measures (self-report/ Likert-type and rationally
scored SJT type) were added to the pre-employment assessment for a grocery chain in
March 2012. Only employees who were hired before May 2012 were eligible to take the
yearly employee survey in June 2012, restricting the key data collection period to two
months. A total of 20,470 applicants completed the pre-employment measures in the twomonth period, and 17,395 employees completed the yearly survey in 2012; however, only
197 completed both. This number is the sample size of the majority of the analyses being
conducted to test the full model. Although 832 accident/injury records were available,
only six belonged to an employee who had both completed the pre-employment measures
as well as the survey, making the objective outcomes portion of the model untestable.

74

Matched pre-employment – accident/injury data was available for 67 participants;
matched employee survey – accident/injury data was available for 600 employees.
The safety climate strength variable was created by 1) creating a unique group
identifier of department within store (e.g., Store 4 Floral, Store 164 Frozen, etc.), 2)
restricting analyses to groups with four or more members, and 3) computing a new
variable where safety climate strength equaled the standard deviation of safety climate
average for the group to which the individual belonged. The restriction for at least four
participants in a group was made because any group with only a single member would
automatically have a standard deviation of zero, but would be an indication of group size
as opposed to climate strength. It was determined that groups with four or more
participants would provide a more accurate and stable depiction of actual safety climate
strength.
There were 204 stores and 14 departments per store, but not all stores had
participants in each department. When the full data set was employed, a total of 2,362
unique groups were present; this number reduced to 1,220 once groups with three or
fewer individuals were filtered out. There was an average of 11.97 employees per group
within the full data set. The 197 matched participants were spread across 161 groups
(1.22 employees per group on average). When examining the actual size of the group
from which each matched participant came (the full data set), the average was 19.83.
The average group size for the matched participants (19.83) was quite a bit larger
than the average group size overall (11.97); this is largely due to differences in the makeup of the groups. Namely, 48% of matched participants were cashiers, which was the
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most common role, in comparison with the overall data set which was only comprised of
30% cashiers. Further, many of the departments that typically have only a single
employee (e.g., Floral) were underrepresented in the matched data, thus increasing the
average group size.
Justification for aggregation. The present study has introduced the construct of
safety climate and argued for its inherent multilevel nature. In order to determine the
appropriate levels of analysis for the variable and to justify aggregation of individual
responses to a group- level construct, a specified set of conditions must be met (Bliese,
2000; Zohar, 2000). Specifically, the unit of analysis may naturally occur, and both
within-group homogeneity and between-group variance must exist. Within-group
homogeneity indicates the degree to which perceptions about safety climate are shared
within a group, where between-group variance indicates the degree to which different
groups within the same organization vary in their safety climate perceptions. On the basis
of these conditions, safety climate strength was intended to be aggregated on individual
scores to Level 2 (department within store). The ICC(1), the ICC(2), and the Rwg(j)
statistic were calculated to provide evidence for aggregation. These statistics have been
used to justify aggregation of data in numerous previous studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 2010;
Wallace & Chen, 2006; Zohar, 2000).
The ICC(1) provides an estimate of the intra-class correlation, which indicates the
amount of variance in the dependent variable that can be attributed to group membership
(Bliese, 2000). The ICC(1) essentially determines between-unit variance compared to
total variance, and is not biased by unit size. A larger ICC(1) indicates that group
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membership has a greater influence on individual perceptions (Klein & Koslowski, 2000;
LeBreton & Senter, 2008). For the present study, the ICC(1) was calculated to determine
whether a meaningful amount of variance in department Safety Climate average could be
attributed to the group (an employee’s department within store).
The ICC(2), which is an estimate of the reliability of unit means in a given
sample, was used to calculate between-group variance. A general rule of thumb is that the
ICC(2) should also be greater than or equal to .70 to conclude that the means reliably
indicate unit scores, as with other measures of reliability (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha; Bryk &
Raudenbush, 1992; Klein & Koslowski, 2002). A larger ICC(2) indicates that mean
ratings distinguish units from each other to a greater degree (James, 1982).
The ICC(1) and ICC(2) were calculated using and intercepts-only mixed model
and a one-way random effects analysis of variance (ANOVA), respectively. In these
analyses, the grouping variable (store_dept) was entered as the predictor and department
Safety Climate average was entered as the dependent variable (Bliese, 1998). In keeping
with all analyses involving group size or safety climate strength, analyses were limited to
groups larger than three (n = 14,609).
The ICC(1) value was calculated by dividing the intercept variance from the fixed
effects output by the sum of the intercept variance and the residual variance. The
calculated ICC(1) was 0.059, which indicates that 5.9% of the variance in Safety Climate
average can be attributed to the department in which the employee works. This number is
within the typical range of ICC(1) values (.05 - .20; Bliese, 2000; Snijders & Bosker,
1999). The ICC(2) value was calculated by dividing the difference of the Mean Square
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Between and Mean Square Within by the Mean Square Between. The calculated ICC(2)
was .413, which indicates that the safety climate means formed at the group-level have
low reliability (Bliese, 2000).
Within-group homogeneity was assessed using the rwg(p) statistic, which is an
index of agreement or consensus between group members. The rwg compares variance of
a variable within a group to an expected random variance. Justification for aggregating a
lower level variable to a higher level of analysis is provided when “variability within a
unit is substantially smaller than the variability expected by chance” (Klein & Koslowski,
2000, p. 222). A larger rwg value is indicative of greater agreement among group
members, with an rwg mean of .70 or greater serving as a common rule of thumb to justify
aggregation (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000).The rwg(p) can
also be calculated using the Mean Square Error in the Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
from a univariate general linear model. An rwg(p) value of .742 was found from the results
of this analysis, indicating that the ratings of safety climate were largely interchangeable
due to the low group variance.
Descriptive statistics were used to understand the amount of variability in safety
climate strength values across groups. The standard deviation was fairly low, SD = 0.229
(n = 13,615). A one-way ANOVA was also conducted where the grouping variable was
the IV and safety climate strength was the DV and the analysis was restricted to groups of
four or larger. The results suggested that the group to which an employee belonged was
significantly related to their safety climate average, F (1219, 13614) = 1.71, p < .001 and
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their safety climate strength, F (1219, 13614) = 3.56x1031, p < .001, indicating significant
group variance.
Multicollinearity. The bivariate relationships between the predictors were tested
to address the issue of multicollinearity, which refers to a strong linear relationship
between predictors (i.e., at least .80; Chatterjee; Hadi, & Price, 2000; Lomax, 2001).
Multicollinearity can be problematic when the independent variables are so highly
correlated that they no longer convey unique information. In other words, determining
which predictor is producing the effect on the dependent variable becomes difficult
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Given the fact that the present study aims to determine whether
personality-related or overt safety items are better predictors of safety performance and
subsequent safety outcomes, it was important to be able to identify the source of the
effect on the dependent variable (Lomax, 2001). Consequently, tests of multicollinearity
were conducted to determine whether this was a potential issue.
Tolerance and its reciprocal, variance inflation factor (VIF), were used to indicate
whether multicollinearity was a potential threat by showing the extent to which the
predictors’ relationships are inflating an individual predictor’s regression coefficient
estimate. A tolerance value approaching zero reflects a high risk of the problem, as does a
VIF of 10 or higher (Kleinbaum et al., 1988; Lomax, 2001). Group size was included in
this test as a control variable to maintain consistency with the other analyses in the
current study. None of the personality-based or overt safety predictors had tolerance or
VIF levels approaching these points, and multicollinearity was determined not to be
problematic (see Table 11).
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However, because of the high degree of multicollinearity between compliance and
participation (correlation of .75), the six items from the two scales were averaged to form
a safety performance scale. This choice was made given the fact that the focus of the
current study is on the predictors of the model and not differentiating between the
components of safety performance. The six items combined had an extremely high
internal reliability (α = .96).
Hypothesis Tests
The first series of hypotheses (1a-c) posited that safety-related personality
variables (conscientiousness, risk aversion, and safety locus of control) would be
positively related to safety outcomes (subjective and objective measures of accidents and
injuries) and that these relationships would be mediated by safety performance. The
second set of hypotheses (2a-b) predicted the same relationships, where the overt
measures of safety are the predictors. All variables in the first two sets of hypotheses are
Level 1 (individual-level) variables.
Bootstrapping was used to test these hypothesized relationships, as detailed by
Preacher and Hayes (2004). Bootstrapping has been suggested to be superior to other
mediation techniques because it is not constrained by underlying assumptions about
sample distributions (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Mediation is indicated by a significant
indirect effect, which is demonstrated when zero does not fall within the 95 percent
confidence interval that is computed around the product term (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).
The authors recommend the use of 5,000 bootstrap resamples of the data with
replacement.
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In line with these recommendations, bootstrapping mediation analyses using
5,000 bootstrap samples (unless otherwise noted in the tables) for bias-corrected
bootstrap confidence intervals were conducted to test Hypotheses 1a – 2b. Hypotheses
with near-misses as the DV required logistic regression bootstrapping because restriction
of the sample to participants with complete data resulted in a dichotomous variable.
Specifically, all matched participants chose either the lowest or the second-lowest nearmiss range out of the five response options. Therefore, unlike mediation models with a
continuous mediator and outcome, the “total effect will not be equal to the sum of the
direct and indirect effects due to the arbitrary scaling of the error in estimation in the
logistic regression model” (SPSS PROCESS documentation, 2012, p. 9).
The effects of the personality and overt safety variables on the objective safety
outcomes could not be tested. Namely, the restriction of the sample to participants with
complete data (n = 6) resulted in dichotomous mediator variable (five of the six
employees had a safety performance average of 5.0 and the sixth had a 3.67, making
safety performance a dichotomous variable). This prevented the bootstrapping analyses
from running when the objective outcomes of missed work days, restricted work days, or
micro-accidents were the dependent variables. The results for each testable proposed
relationship are below. Additional statistics for hypotheses 1a-c can be found in Table 12;
additional statistics for hypotheses 2a-b can be found in Table 13.
1a) The positive relationships between conscientiousness and safety
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance.
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The results from bootstrapping indicated that the direct effect of
conscientiousness on any of the outcomes was not significant (near misses, t =
.764, p = .445, β = -0.502 with a 95% confidence interval (CI) from -1.790 to
0.786., minor injuries, t = 0.933, p = .352, β = 0.147 with a 95% CI from -0.164 to
0.457, MSK pain, t = 0.601, p = .549, β = 0.112 with a 95% CI from -0.256 to
0.481). Bootstrapping analyses also failed to yield a significant mean indirect
effect of conscientiousness on near-misses, β = -0.080 with a 95% CI from -0.451
to 0.157, or minor injuries, β = 0.0003 with a 95% CI from -0.073 to 0.063,
through safety performance.
The indirect effect of conscientiousness on MSK pain through safety
performance was significant, β = -0.136 with a 95% CI from -0.350 to -0.025.
This indicates that higher conscientiousness was associated with lower MSK pain
when operating through safety performance. The presence of negative indirect
effects and positive direct effects indicate the presence of inconsistent mediation
(Davis, 1985), i.e., a suppressor effect (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000).
Namely, the indirect relationship between conscientiousness and MSK pain is
artificially inflated by the negative and significant safety performance-MSK pain
relationship (β = -0.5156, p < .001, 95% CI from -0.7747 to -0.2565). Total
effects for the model were not significant.
Practically, this pattern of relationships suggests that more conscientious
people actually have more MSK pain, perhaps due to their proclivity to work
quickly. However, conscientious employees who also have high safety
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performance overall have lower MSK pain, indicating that the safe behaviors can
make up for the negative effect that high conscientiousness could have
independently.
1b) The positive relationships between risk propensity and safety
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance.
The direct effect of risk propensity on any of the outcomes was not
significant, (near misses, t = -0.100, p = .920, β =-0.034 with a 95% CI from 0.705 to 0.636; minor injuries, t = 0.642, p = .522, β =0.050 with a 95% CI from 0.103 to 0.203; MSK pain, t = 1.586 p = .114, β =0.145 with a 95% CI from 0.035 to 0.326). Results from bootstrapping failed to yield a significant mean
indirect effect of risk propensity on near-misses (β =-0.039 with a 95% CI from 0.204 to 0.044) or minor injuries (β = 0.002 with a 95% CI from -0.026 to 0.029)
through safety performance.
The indirect effect of risk propensity on MSK pain through safety
performance was significant, β = -0.057 with a 95% confidence interval from 0.150 to -0.007. This indicates that lower risk propensity is associated with lower
reported MSK pain, operating through safety performance. (Note that risk
propensity was recoded such that a higher value on this variable is indicative of
lower risk-taking inclination).
The presence of negative indirect effects and positive direct effects
indicate the presence of suppression. Namely, the indirect relationship between
risk propensity and MSK pain is artificially inflated by the negative and
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significant safety performance-MSK pain relationship (β = -0.532, p < .001 with a
95% CI from -0.789 to -0.2762). Total effects for the model were not significant.
This pattern of relationships suggests that people less inclined to take risk actually
have more MSK pain; however, because the individuals who also have high
safety performance overall have lower MSK pain, the safe behaviors can make up
for the negative effect that low risk propensity alone could have.
1c) The positive relationships between safety locus of control and safety
outcomes will be mediated by safety performance.
Results from bootstrapping indicated that the direct effect of safety locus
of control on any of the outcomes was not significant (near-misses, t = 0.865, p =
.392, β = 0.494 with a 95% CI from -0.637 to 1.625; minor injuries, t = 1.60, p =
.248, β = 0.140 with a 95% CI from -0.098 to 0.378; MSK pain, t = 1.300, p =
.196, β = 0.186 with a 95% CI from -0.097 to 0.469). Bootstrapping analyses also
failed to yield a significant mean indirect effect of safety locus of control on nearmisses (β = -0.085 with a 95% CI from -0.399 to 0.084) or minor injuries (β =
0.002 with a 95% CI from -0.059 to 0.050) through safety performance.
The indirect effect of safety locus of control on MSK pain through safety
performance was significant, β = -0.104 with a 95% confidence interval from 0.268 to -0.019. This indicates that higher safety locus of control is associated
with lower MSK pain when operating through safety compliance or safety
participation.
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The presence of negative indirect effects and positive direct effects
indicate the presence of suppression. Namely, the indirect relationship between
safety locus of control and MSK pain is artificially inflated by the negative and
significant safety performance-MSK pain relationship (β = -0.5312, p < .001 with
a 95% CI from -0.789 to -0.273). Total effects for the model were not significant.
The fact that the pattern of results with MSK pain as the outcome greatly
differed from those with near-miss or minor injuries as the outcome indicates that
there is something distinguishing MSK pain from the other subjective safety
outcomes. For example, it is possible that significant effects can be detected with
MSK pain easier than the other two outcomes since it is expected to be a higherfrequency event. Another possible explanation is that MSK pain may be such a
common-place experience that it is harder for participants to clearly remember the
frequency of such an outcome and had to guess as to their experience with it.
2a) The positive relationships between self-reported safety behavior (SJT
format) and safety outcomes will be mediated by safety performance.
Results from bootstrapping failed to yield a significant mean indirect
effect of self-reported safety behavior (SJT format) on any of the outcomes (nearmisses, (t = 0.792, p = .423, β = -0.045 with a 95% CI from -0.359 to 0.048;
minor injuries, t = -0.805, p = .422, β = 0.003 with a 95% CI from -0.026 to
0.061; MSK pain, t = -0.561, p = .576, β = -0.063 with a 95% CI from -0.229 to
0.037) through safety performance. The direct effect of self-reported safety
behavior (SJT format) on any of the outcomes was also not significant (near-
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misses, β = 0.429 with a 95% CI from -0.632 to 1.489; minor injuries, β = -0.096
with a 95% CI from -0.330 to 0.139; MSK pain, β = -0.079 with a 95% CI from 0.358 to 0.200).
2b) The positive relationships between self-reported safety behavior (selfreport format) and safety outcomes will be mediated by safety
performance.
Results from bootstrapping failed to yield a significant mean indirect
effect of self-reported safety behavior (self-report format) on any of the outcomes
(near-misses, t = 0.058, p = .954, β = -0.045 with a 95% CI from -0.359 to 0.048;
minor injuries, t = 0.720, p = .472, β = 0.003 with a 95% CI from -0.026 to 0.061;
MSK pain, t = 1.523, p = .128, β = -0.063 with a 95% CI from -0.229 to 0.037)
through safety performance. The direct effect of self-reported safety behavior
(SJT format) on any of the outcomes was also not significant (near-misses, β =
0.037 with a 95% CI from -1.222 to 1.296 minor injuries, β = 0.105 with a 95%
CI from -0.182 to 0.391 or MSK β = 0.262 with a 95% CI from -0.076 to 0.601).
The third (3a-c) and fourth (4a-b) sets of hypotheses stated that the positive
relationships that the personality-related and overt safety variables have with safety
performance would be moderated by group-level safety climate strength. Specifically, the
predictor-criterion relationships were hypothesized to be weaker when safety climate is
stronger, due to the diminishing effect that strong situations have on the variance of
individual differences.
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Mixed models were going to be used to test these series of hypotheses because
safety climate is a group-level, or Level 2, variable; however, the small sample size
eliminated the ability to conduct multilevel modeling on the data. Hox (2002; 2010)
suggests a minimum of 50 groups with at least five cases per group to avoid increased
Type I errors and underestimation of random effects and their standard errors. Busing
(1993) and van der Leeden and Busing (1994) recommend having at least 30 groups with
at least 30 observations per group for sufficient power to detect cross-level interactions,
as proposed in the current study. Other recommendations for sample size are more
rigorous: Hox (1998) proposed that 50 groups with 20 cases per group would be
preferable for examining cross-level interactions. However, in the current study, the 197
matched participants were spread across 161 groups. Therefore, linear multiple regression
was conducted to test these hypotheses with the inclusion of a dummy variable to
partially address the nested data. This variable was created to indicate if the participant
was the only member of their group (n = 135, 68.5%) or whether they were part of a
group with two or more individuals (n = 62, 31.5%).
The safety climate strength values were calculated using the entire survey data
set, where groups had greater than or equal to four members. An individual’s safety
climate strength value is the same for each member within a given group (department
within store), and is equivalent to the standard deviation of the average safety climate for
each group in the complete survey data set. The entire group’s responses were used to
calculate group-level safety climate strength to account for the effect that each
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participant’s safety climate perceptions and strength would be affected by the rest of the
group, even if those members did not have complete data across the entire study.
To test the hypotheses, a series of five-step moderated regressions were
conducted, where the demographic variables of race, gender, age, and tenure were
entered as Step 1. The group size dummy variable was entered as Step 2 to partially
account for nesting. Safety climate average was entered as Step 3 to control for the
effects of the variable’s valence. The group mean-centered personality or overt safety
variables were entered as Step 4 along with safety climate strength; the interaction term
of the latter two variables was entered as the final step (Step 5). See Table 14 for
additional statistics on hypotheses 3a-c.
3a) The conscientiousness - safety performance relationship will be
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the
relationship between conscientiousness and safety performance will be
weaker when safety climate is stronger.
Although the overall model was significant, F (9, 80 = 6.00, p < .001), and
accounted for 40.3% of the outcome variance, the interaction term did not account for
unique variance in the model (R2 = 0.000, p =.820. Rather, safety climate average was
the only step that accounted for unique significant variance in the model (R2 = 0.391, p
< .001), accounting for 39.1% of the variance in safety performance uniquely.
3b) The risk propensity - safety performance relationship will be
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the
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relationship between risk propensity and safety performance will be
weaker when safety climate is stronger.
Although the overall model was significant, F (9, 80 = 6.10, p < .001), and
accounted for 40.7% of the outcome variance, the interaction term did not account for
unique variance in the model (R2 = 0.003, p = .514). Again, safety climate average was
the only step that accounted for unique significant variance in the model.
3c) The safety locus of control - safety performance relationship will be
moderated by group-level safety climate strength, such that the
relationship between safety locus of control and safety performance will
be weaker when safety climate is stronger.
Although the overall model was significant, F (9, 80 = 6.13, p < .001), and
accounted for 40.8% of the outcome variance, the interaction term did not account for
unique variance in the model (R2 = 0.004, p = .457). Rather, safety climate average was
the only step that accounted for unique significant variance in the model. See Table 15
for additional statistics on hypotheses 4a-b.
4a) The safety self-reported safety behavior (SJT format) - safety
performance relationship will be moderated by group-level safety climate
strength, such that the relationship between self-reported safety behavior
(SJT format) and safety performance will be weaker when safety climate
is stronger.
Although the overall model was significant, F (9, 80 = 6.03, p < .001), and
accounted for 40.4% of the outcome variance, the interaction term did not account
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for unique variance in the model (R2 = 0.001, p = .702). Rather, safety climate
average was the only step that accounted for unique significant variance in the
model.
4b) The safety self-reported safety behavior (self-report format) - safety
performance relationship will be moderated by group-level safety climate
strength, such that the relationship between self-reported safety behavior
(self-report format) and safety performance will be weaker when safety
climate is stronger.
Although the overall model was significant, F (9, 80 = 6.21, p < .001), and
accounted for 41.1% of the outcome variance, the interaction term did not account
for unique variance in the model (R2 = 0.006, p = .387). Rather, safety climate
average was the only step that accounted for unique significant variance in the
model.
Exploratory Analyses
Because few significant relationships existed within the proposed hypotheses
when restricting the sample to the matched data (n = 197), exploratory analyses were
conducted to determine whether individual components of the model could be supported
when allowing all participants to be included in the analyses. Testing the model to the
extent possible with the larger sample could help determine whether the non-significant
results could be attributed to a lack of power.
For example, although only six participants completed the pre-employment
measures, the survey measures, and had an accident/injury, 67 participants who
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completed the pre-employment measures also had an accident/injury. Therefore, direct
relationships between the personality-oriented or overt safety measures with objective
safety outcomes could be examined. Likewise, 600 participants who completed the
employee survey measures also had an accident/injury, facilitating exploration of the
direct relationships between these variables. Lastly, a total of 17,395 participants
completed the employee survey measures; thus, any relationships between the scales on
the survey could be explored (i.e., safety performance, safety climate average and
strength, subjective safety outcomes).
Pre-employment measures as accident/injury predictors. A dichotomous
outcome was created to indicate the presence of any kind of accident or injury; this
enabled all three objective safety outcomes to be combined into a single, broader
outcome. A series of logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine the effects
of the personality-oriented variables and the overt-safety variables on accident/injury
occurrence. The demographic variables of race, gender, and age were always entered as
categorical variables in Step 1 to control for their effects). (Tenure was removed from all
logistic regressions as its inclusion drastically reduced the sample size; correlational
analyses indicated that the removal of this variable was very unlikely to have an impact
on the significance of subsequent analyses.)
The R2L, or likelihood ratio, is reported for all logistic regression analyses, which
is more powerful than a Wald test (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The R2L is calculated by
dividing the change in the -2 Log Likelihood attributed to the target predictors by the -2
Log Likelihood for the null model. This value is analogous to dividing the sum of squares
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total by the sum of squares model in ordinary least squares regression. The resulting
value gives an indication of improvement in model fit, with a larger value indicating
greater percent improvement in fit due to the predictor(s) (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken,
2003).
Personality-oriented variables. A direct logistic regression was conducted to
determine if the three personality-based variables of safety locus of control,
conscientiousness, and risk propensity were predictive of accident/injury occurrence. A
test of the full model with all predictors against the model with the control variables was
not statistically significant, χ2 (3, n = 213) = 4.923, p = .178, indicating that these
predictors as a set could not reliability distinguish between employees who had an
accident and those who did not. The likelihood ratio was low, R2L = .134. Tests of model
effects from the generalized linear model indicated that none of the individual predictors
significantly contributed to the model, although conscientiousness did approach
significance (χ2 = 3.14, p = .076; see Table 16).
Overt safety variables. A direct logistic regression was conducted to determine if
the two overt safety-oriented variables were predictive of any accident/injury occurrence.
A test of the full model with all predictors against the control variables model was not
statistically significant, χ2 (2, n = 213) = 0.94, p =.624. Tests of model effects from the
generalized linear model indicated that none of the individual predictors significantly
contributed to the model. The likelihood ratio was very low, R2L = .026 (see Table 17).
Employee survey measures as objective safety predictors. A series of
hierarchical linear regressions were conducted to determine whether safety performance
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was related to the objective outcomes of restricted and missed work days of the model
when employing the full data set. A logistic regression was used to determine whether
safety performance was predictive of micro-accidents or any accident/injury. Further,
average safety climate and safety climate strength were explored as predictors of microaccidents and any accident/injury.
In each analysis, the demographic variables were entered as Step 1 to control for
their effects. As described earlier, the dummy variable indicating if the participant was
the only member of their group was entered as Step 2 to account for the nested nature of
the data.
Safety performance. As with the bootstrapping analyses, the six items from the
safety compliance and safety participation scales were averaged to form a safety
performance scale. This predictor was included instead of examining safety compliance
and participation separately. The results suggested that safety performance was not a
significant predictor of restricted work days, F (1, 591) = 0.5145, R2 = 0.001, p = .474,
or missed work days F (1, 591) = 1.098, R2 = 0.002, p = .295 (see Table 18).
A direct logistic regression was conducted to determine if safety performance was
a significant predictor of micro-accidents. A test of the full model with all predictors
against the control model was not statistically significant, χ2 (1, n = 598) = 3.49, p = .062
(although it approached significance), indicating that these predictors as a set could not
reliability distinguish between employees who had a micro-accident and those who did
not. The likelihood ratio was very small, R2L =.007 (see Table 19).
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A logistic regression was also conducted to assess the impact of safety
performance on any accident/injury occurrence. Although the overall model was
significant, χ2 (18, n = 17,287) = 63.57, p < .001, the final step to test for safety
performance was not significant, χ2 (1, n = 17,287) = 0.491, p = .483. Rather, the
significant effects were attributed to age (χ2 = 12.60, p < .001). Specifically, employees
aged 20-24 were 1.614 times more likely to not have an accident/injury than those under
the age of 20 (the reference group) and those aged 45-49 were 1.58 times more likely to
have an accident than those under 20. The likelihood ratio for this model was very small,
R2L < .000 (see Table 20).
Average safety climate. A direct logistic regression was conducted to determine
whether average safety climate was predictive of micro-accidents; the analysis was
restricted to groups with four or more members. Average safety climate was not a
significant predictor, χ2 (1, n = 466) = 0.410, p = .522, indicating that the model was not
able to distinguish between participants who had a micro-accident and those who did not.
The likelihood ratio was very small, R2L = .001 (see Table 21).
More broadly, a direct logistic regression was also conducted on accident/injury
occurrence as an outcome; the analysis was restricted to groups with four or more
members. Safety climate average did not contribute uniquely to the model, χ2 (1, n =
13,615) = 0.160, p = .689; rather, the significant effects were primarily attributed to age,
χ2 (n = 15,615) = 8.07, p < .01. Specifically, employees between 30 and 34 years old
were 1.67 times more likely to have an accident/injury than those under the age of 20 (the
reference group); those 45-49, 50-54, and 55-60 were 1.95, 1.89 and 1.34 times more
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likely to have an accident/injury than those under the age of 20, respectively. The
likelihood ratio for the model was very small, R2L < .000 (see Table 22).
Safety climate strength. A logistic regression was also conducted to assess the
impact of safety climate strength on micro-accidents, restricting analyses to groups with
four or more members. Safety climate average was included to control for the variable’s
valence. The model did not reach statistical significance, χ2 (1, n = 466) = 0.014, p =
.905. The likelihood ratio was very small, R2L < .000 (see Table 23).
More broadly, a logistic regression was also conducted to assess the impact of
safety climate strength on any accident/injury occurrence. Safety climate strength did not
contribute uniquely to the model, χ2 (1, n = 13,615) = 0.013, p = .909. The likelihood
ratio was very small, R2L < .000 (see Table 24).
Employee survey measures as safety performance predictors. A series of
linear regressions were conducted to determine whether average safety climate or safety
climate strength were related to safety performance, the proposed mediator, when
employing the full data set. For each analysis, the demographic variables of race, age,
gender, and tenure were entered as Step 1 to control for their effects and the group
membership dummy variable was added as Step 2. Analyses were restricted to groups
with four or more members.
Average safety climate. The results suggested that the demographics and group
membership did not account for significant variance in the outcome variable. Average
safety climate uniquely explained 39.2% of the variance in safety performance, F (1,
5102) = 3292.46, R2 = .392, p < .001 (see Table 25). The relationship was in the
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expected direction; namely, higher average safety climate was predictive of higher safety
performance.
Safety climate strength. For this analysis, safety climate average was entered as
the third step to control for the valence of the variable. The results suggested that group
safety climate strength was predictive of safety performance above and beyond
demographics, group membership, and average safety climate, R2 = .002, p < .001. The
final model accounted for 39.6% of the variance in safety performance and the effect of
the target variable was also in the expected direction. Namely, greater safety climate
strength was associated with higher reports of safety performance (see Table 26).1
Employee survey measures as subjective safety predictors. A series of linear
regressions were conducted to determine whether the safety performance composite
(safety compliance and participation average) was predictive of subjective safety
outcomes when using the full set of data. Further, another series of linear regressions
were conducted to determine whether average safety climate or safety climate strength
were related to the subjective outcomes of the model when employing the full data set.
As with the previous analyses, demographic variables were entered as Step 1 to control
for their effects, the group membership dummy variable was added as Step 2. Analyses
were restricted to groups with at least four members; pairwise deletion was used to
prevent unnecessary restriction of the sample size.
Safety performance. The results suggested that safety performance was predictive
of all three subjective safety outcomes after controlling for demographics and group
1

The interaction between safety climate average and safety climate strength was a significant predictor of
safety performance, accounting for an additional 0.6% of the variance in safety performance, p < .001.
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membership, although the effect sizes were small. Namely, the model accounted for 0.9%
of the variance in near-misses, F (1, 5160) = 34.48, R2 = .007, p < .001. Safety
performance also explained 0.6% of the variance in minor injuries uniquely, with the
complete model explaining a total of 0.8% of the variance in minor injuries, F (1, 5156)
= 33.50, R2 = .006, p < .001. Lastly, 0.9% of the variance in MSK pain was explained
by the complete model, F (1, 5160) = 49.68, R2 = .009, p < .001, all of which was
uniquely attributed to the safety performance predictor (see Table 27).
Average safety climate. Average safety climate was significantly predictive of
near-misses, F (1, 5102) = 86.38, R2 = .017, p <.001. The final model accounted for
1.9% of the variance in near-misses, with 1.7% solely due to safety climate average (p <
.001). Average safety climate was also predictive of minor injuries, F (1, 5102) = 62.50,
R2 = .012, p < .001, with the final model accounting for 1.4% of the variance in minor
injuries. Average safety climate was also significantly related to MSK pain, F (1, 5102)
= 134.68, R2 = .026, p < .001); the final model accounted for 2.6% of the variance in
MSK pain, all of which was due to the safety climate average predictor (p < .001). All
relationships were in the expected direction; namely, higher safety climate was related to
lower reported near-misses, minor injuries, and MSK pain (see Table 25).
Safety climate strength. For this analysis, safety climate average was entered as
Step 3 to control for its valence. The results suggested that group-level safety climate
strength did not significantly predict any of the subjective outcomes above and beyond
safety climate average (near-miss, F (1, 5101) = 0.38, R2 = .000, p = .537; minor
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injuries, F (1, 5101) = 0.51, R2 = .000, p = .476; MSK pain, F (1, 5101) = 0.00, R2 =
.000, p = .993; see Table 26).
Summary of significant relationships. Personality-oriented variables
(conscientiousness, risk propensity, and safety locus of control) were predictive of MSK
pain through safety performance. Safety climate average accounted for upwards of 40%
of the outcome variance in safety performance, indicating that individuals working in
climate geared towards safety are much more likely to engage in safety compliance and
participation behaviors. Safety climate strength was also significantly related to safety
performance above and beyond the effects of safety climate average (along with
demographics and group membership), although the effects were quite small.
Safety performance as a composite measure was predictive of all subjective safety
outcomes (near-misses, minor injuries, and MSK pain). Safety climate average was also
predictive of all three subjective safety outcomes. The practical implications of these
relationships will be explored in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION

Summary of Findings
The current study examined the relationships that personality-oriented and overt
safety variables had with objective and subjective safety outcomes, as operating through
safety performance. The role of safety climate strength was also explored by including in
the model as a moderator of the relationships that personality and overt safety predictors
were hypothesized to have with subjective and objective safety outcomes. The following
section will detail the tests of these hypotheses along with the exploratory analyses
conducted ad hoc.
Hypothesis tests. The first set of hypotheses stated that the positive relationships
that the three personality variables were expected to have with safety outcomes would be
mediated by safety performance. Because safety compliance and participation could not
reliability be differentiated, they were combined to form a safety performance composite.
Tests of indirect effects with objective safety outcomes (restricted work days,
missed work days, and micro-accidents) could not be tested due to low sample size. For
the subjective outcomes, this hypothesis was only supported when MSK pain was the
outcome; indirect relationships with minor injuries or near-misses as the dependent
variables were not significant. Further, none of the direct relationships between the
personality variables and the safety outcomes were significant. This may provide some
evidence for MSK pain as the most sensitive safety outcome and also highlights the
importance of including relevant mediators such as safety performance. However, it is
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also important to note that in suppression was present in these relationships; namely, the
indirect relationship between the personality predictors and MSK pain were artificially
inflated by the negative and significant safety performance-MSK pain relationship
(MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). Therefore, these results should be interpreted
with caution.
Another possible interpretation of these findings is that personality-based
measures may have greater utility than overt variables in predicting post-hire safety
behaviors. It is possible that the overt items were too transparent, and that applicants
could easily determine the “right” answer on the assessments, increasing their ability to
distort their responses to match the most desirable answer. This notion is in line with a
meta-analysis conducted by Alliger and Dwight (2000), who found that while scores on
both personality-based and overt integrity tests can be by coaching and instructions to
fake, personality-based tests were more resistant to both. This resistance would force
applicants to answer honestly and would likely increase the variability in responses,
increasing the likelihood to detect significant relationships between assessment scores
and safety outcomes.
The second set of hypotheses proposed the same mediated relationships with the
two overt safety variables as the predictors. Neither the direct nor the indirect
hypothesized relationships reached statistical significance. Although many other studies
have included safety performance as direct predictor of safety outcomes (e.g., Clarke,
2006b; Jiang et al., 2010; Probst & Brubaker, 2001), it is possible that the inclusion of
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other relevant variables could have explained additional variance in the proposed
relationships (this area will be explored further below).
The third (3a-c) and fourth (4a-b) sets of hypotheses stated that the positive
relationships that the personality-related and overt safety variables have with safety
performance would be moderated by group-level safety climate strength. Specifically, the
predictor-criterion relationships were hypothesized to be weaker when safety climate is
stronger due to the diminishing effect that strong situations have on the variance of
individual differences (Beaty et al., 2001).
Variance at the group level was a pre-requisite to test these relationships. The
ICC(1) was low, indicating that what little variation existed in safety climate average was
attributed mostly to the individual and not to the group to which the employee belonged.
This was also seen in the low standard deviation of safety climate strength (SD = 0.229).
However, one-way ANOVAs indicated that the group in which an employee worked was
significantly related to their safety climate average and strength. Thus, although group
effects were small, they were present nonetheless. Despite variance existing at Level 2,
insufficient sample size at both levels prevented the testing of these analyses using
multilevel models as initially proposed in the current study. Linear multiple regression
was used to test these hypotheses with the inclusion of a group membership dummy
variable to partially address the nested data.
The results of these hypothesis tests indicated that the interaction between any of
the personality variables with safety climate strength did not uniquely predict safety
performance. Although the models were significant, safety climate average was the only
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step that significantly accounted for unique variance in these models, accounting for 39%
of the variance in safety performance. Likewise, the interaction between both overt safety
variables and safety climate strength did not significantly predict safety performance.
The fact that no significant moderating relationships were found makes
conceptual sense when considering their basis. Namely, the hypotheses were founded on
the notion that individual personalities play a larger role in weak versus strong situations.
Whereas strong situations elicit uniform behavior, weak situations should result in a
greater variability in behavioral responses (Mischel, 1973, 1976; Schneider et al., 2002).
This variability allows for greater expression of personality because employees rely on
their predispositions to dictate appropriate behavior since the situation is not specifying it
outright (Beaty et al., 2001). The safety climate in the current study was quite strong, as
evidenced by a low standard deviation of safety climate average in the unique
department-within-store groups (SD = 0.229, n = 13,615). Therefore, the fact that
personality by safety climate strength interactions did not emerge is in line with the
theory of situational strength. The findings could also indicate that, at least in the current
study’s sample, the employees’ environment had a stronger effect on their safety
perceptions and behavior than their personalities.
Exploratory analyses. Because few significant relationships existed within the
proposed hypotheses when restricting the sample to the matched data (n = 197),
exploratory analyses were conducted to determine whether individual components of the
model could be supported when allowing all participants to be included in the analyses.
Testing the model to the extent possible with the larger sample was conducted in order to
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help determine whether the non-significant results could be attributed to a lack of
statistical power.
First, a series of logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine the
effects of the personality-oriented variables and the overt-safety variables on any
accident/injury occurrence. The model with the personality predictors was not
statistically significant, but conscientiousness as a predictor did approach significance.
The same analysis with the overt-safety predictors was non-significant.
Second, because the objective outcomes could not be tested using the matched
data only, employee survey measures were examined as predictors of the objective safety
outcomes using the entire data set. Safety performance was not a significant predictor of
restricted or missed work days, or of accident/injury occurrence. However, safety
performance did approach significance with micro-accidents as the dependent variable.
Significant relationships were more likely to be found with micro-accidents as the
dependent variable in comparison to accidents and injuries because the latter are
statistically rare events and are therefore more likely to present skewed distributions
(Zohar, 2000). Thus, micro-accidents are considered to be a more fine-grained safety
measure that may more adequately tap the subtle nuances of safety (Lingard, Cooke, &
Blismas, 2010).
Logistic regression analyses suggested that average safety climate was not
predictive of micro-accidents or any accident/injury occurrence. Likewise, safety climate
strength did not significantly predict of either of these outcomes.
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Third, employee survey measures (average safety climate and safety climate
strength) were examined as predictors of safety performance. Average safety climate was
a strong predictor of safety performance, accounting for over 39% of the variance in this
outcome after controlling for demographics and group membership. The strong
relationship between safety climate average and safety performance indicates that that
individuals working in climate geared towards safety are much more likely to engage in
safety compliance and participation behaviors. Safety climate strength was also
predictive of safety performance above and beyond the effects of safety climate average
(along with demographics and group membership); however, the effects were small (R2
= .002, p < .001).
Lastly, employee survey measures were examined as predictors of subjective
safety outcomes (near-miss, minor injuries, and MSK pain). Safety performance as a
composite measure was predictive of all subjective safety outcomes (near-misses, minor
injuries, and MSK pain). However, the amount of variance accounted for by safety
performance was less than 1% for all three of the respective outcomes. Safety climate
average was also predictive of all three subjective safety outcomes, uniquely accounting
for a slightly higher amount of unique variance, ranging from 1.2% for minor injuries and
2.6% for MSK pain. Safety climate strength did not account for additional variance above
and beyond safety climate average.
The reminder of this chapter will begin with a description of the limitations of the
current study and directions for future research. Practical implications of the results will
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be also discussed. Lastly, the strengths of the current study and an explanation of how the
study contributes to this field of research will conclude the chapter.
Limitations & Directions for Future Research
Despite the many strengths of the design of the current study, few significant
relationships were found between the variables of interest; this may be due to the
limitations of the study. These potential limitations as well as opportunities for mitigating
them in future studies are explored below.
It is likely that the most damaging limitation to the current study was low sample
size for matched participants. Despite the fact that 20,470 applicants completed the preemployment measures and 17,395 employees completed the survey measures, only 197
completed both. Furthermore, a mere six of these individuals had an accident/injury; thus,
the full model could not be tested as designed. Although the pre-employment measures
were supposed to be introduced in November 2011, logistical complications with the
grocery store sample and the talent management company managing the application
process prevented their introduction until March 2012. Therefore, only two months of
pre-employment data could be collected, as opposed to the five months proposed in the
original design (only employees who had been hired before May 2012 were eligible to
take the yearly employee survey in June 2012). A longer data collection period would
have increased the number of individuals who completed all measures and would have
also increased the time period of which hired individuals could have had an
accident/injury. Future research of this nature should be designed to err on the side of a
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longer time period due to the low base rate nature of accidents (Burke & Signal, 2010)
and to allow for unforeseen logistical constraints.
Another limitation may have been the extensive messaging from the grocery
chain around safety. Although the intent was to help employees understand the inclusion
of the new survey measures, the heavy emphasis on safety may have affected responses
to survey items. Namely, employees are aware that the survey is confidential but not
anonymous and that answers could in fact be linked back to the individual if the company
desired to do so. Employees may have refrained from answering completely honestly
about any unsafe behaviors for fear of punishment. Low variability in safety outcome
measures clearly affects likelihood to detect significant effects, so it is possible that
reports of unsafe behaviors or outcomes would be larger if a separate survey was
conducted apart from the annual employee survey.
In fact, under-reporting of safety incidents has been found to occur frequently in
studies of this nature. Probst, Brubaker, and Barsotti (2008) conducted a study to
determine whether data from OSHA logs kept by construction contractor companies
differed from those kept by the insurance companies who received their respective
medical claims. The authors found that the companies’ had far fewer reports less than the
insurance companies. Specifically, the results suggested that “while the annual injury rate
reported to OSHA was 3.11 injuries per 100 workers, the rate of eligible injuries that
were not reported to OSHA was 10.90 injuries per 100 employees” (p. 1147).
Underreporting was especially prevalent when companies had lower safety climate
averages as a whole, with 81% of eligible injuries underreported in organizations with a
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poor safety climate compared to 47% in organizations with a high safety climate.
Similarly, Morse et al. (2005) found musculoskeletal disorders (MSD) to be
underreported, with only 1,259 out of 21,500 MSD cases reported to the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs or to the Occupational Disease Surveillance System.
Future research could attempt to log safety incidents through other means (e.g., safety
checks by supervisors) or could try to statistically correct for underreporting.
The current study proposed that the positive relationships that the three
personality and overt safety variables were expected to have with safety outcomes would
be mediated by safety performance; however, these hypotheses were not supported.
Although many other studies have included safety performance as direct predictor of
safety outcomes (e.g., Clarke, 2006b; Jiang et al., 2010; Probst & Brubaker, 2001), it is
possible that the inclusion of other relevant variables could have explained additional
variance in the proposed relationships.
For example, in a study conducted in India with 1,566 employees, Vinokdumar
and Bhasi (2010) found self-reported safety knowledge and safety motivation to be the
key mediators in explaining the relationships that safety management practices had with
safety compliance and safety participation. Safety knowledge was measured by five items
such as “I know how to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents in the workplace.”
Safety motivation was also measured by five items, such as “I feel it is important to
encourage others to use safe practices.” In their final model, the authors showed safety
motivation to have a strong relationship with safety compliance (r = .48, p < .01) and
safety participation (r = .33, p < .01). Safety knowledge had smaller relationships with
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the two outcomes, safety compliance (r = .13, p < .01) and participation (r = .25, p < .01).
The authors concluded that the study “suggests that to get positive results in terms of
safety compliance and participation safety management practices … must be designed to
produce changes in safety knowledge and motivation of the workers” (p. 2092).
Similarly, Neal, Griffin and Hart (2000) found the relationship between safety climate
and safety performance was mediated by safety knowledge and motivation. The same
mediating relationship was found by Griffin and Neal (2000).
Future researchers could test the current model and also include another mediator,
safety attitudes. Safety attitudes are the beliefs and emotions an individual holds
regarding safety policies and practices (Neal & Griffin, 2004; Rundmo & Hale, 2003).
These attitudes also include how the committed the individual is to safety and the degree
of personal responsibility he/she feels towards it (Henning et al., 2008). Importantly,
safety attitudes are the product of both individual differences and the environment (Neal
& Griffin, 2004). Henning et al. (2008) conducted a study with 190 university students;
the authors found that certain individual differences (i.e., agreeableness,
conscientiousness, prevention regulatory focus, fatalism) to significantly predict safety
attitudes. The authors stated that their findings “suggest individuals who are ‘riskier’ in
their personalities hold more negative safety attitudes, and previous research suggests
individuals with higher levels of these traits tend to … experience more accidents” (p.
344). Therefore, the inclusion of safety attitudes as an additional mediator may explain
additional variance around the outcomes of interest.
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Practical Implications
The current study explored the role of personality-based and overt safety-related
variables as predictors of subjective and objective outcomes. Although none of the
independent variables were significant predictors of the outcomes included in the study,
conscientiousness did approach significance when examined as an antecedent of
accident/injury occurrence. This highlights the integral role that human resource
professionals can play in reducing occupational accidents and injuries. When a company
implements safety-related practices, the importance of safety is conveyed to employees,
which should orient their actions to behave in a safer manner (Neal & Griffin, 2004).
Hiring individuals oriented to behave safely on the job is one such practice. In fact, the
selection process has been deemed the “first line of defense an organization has against
hiring unsafe workers;” namely, riskier candidates can be screened out or placed in less
hazardous positions (Forcier et al., 2001, p. 62). Moreover, once an organization
establishes itself as a safety-conscious workplace, candidates who are inclined to work
safely should be drawn to this organization, further developing a culture of safety
(Vrendenburgh, 2002).
The present study built upon existing safety climate literature by replicating the
relationship between average safety climate and safety performance (e.g., Neal, Griffin,
& Hart, 2000; Pousette, Larsson, & Törner, 2008). The fact that safety climate strength
significantly predicted safety performance also extends research literature in this
relatively unexplored area behavior. Further, the results of correlational analyses
suggested that employees in groups with stronger safety climates were less likely to miss
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work days due to an accident/injury. To date, only a single study found has examined
safety climate strength an antecedent of safety behavior (i.e., Lingard, Cooke, & Blismas,
2010). Lingard et al. (2010) found that safety climates that are weak are also more likely
to be low (i.e., safety is a low priority), whereas strong climates were more likely to be
high.
Thus, even the small effects found in the current study demonstrate the utility of
this construct for explaining additional variance around safety-related outcomes.
Practitioners should be aware, therefore, not only of the valence of the safety climate
within organizational groups, but should also take into account the strength of that
climate, taking care to improve both. Having a single employee with divergent climate
perceptions could possibly derail the whole group, as climate perceptions are theorized to
shape through social interaction with colleagues (Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Zohar,
2010). This theory is supported by research that demonstrates that social influence from
interacting with others leads to changes in individual’s feelings and behaviors (Rashotte,
2007). A strong safety climate reflects less ambiguity regarding organizational safety
practices and increases the cohesiveness of group perceptions and expectations (Dickson,
Resick, & Hanges, 2006). It also reduces the likelihood that strong personalities could
have negative outcomes, since individual discretion becomes less salient in a strong
situation, where many cues provide information about how to behave (Hattrup &
Jackson, 1996; Meyer, Dalal & Bonaccio, 2009; Mischel, 1977).
Safety performance, along with safety climate average, was also found to be a
significant antecedent of all subjective safety outcomes (near-misses, minor injuries, and
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MSK pain). The direct relationship between safety performance and micro-accidents also
approached significance. This highlights that organizations should take note of how
employees behave with respect to the formally mandated safety component of an
employee’s job as well as the informal extra-role behaviors. The former directly
contributes to workplace safety (e.g., wearing personal protective equipment) whereas the
latter indirectly contributes it by creating a safety-supportive environment (e.g., attending
safety meetings; Griffin & Neal, 2000).
Strengths & Contribution of the Current Study
Many design elements of the current study were chosen in line with best practices
for sound research. The study drew from existing integrity research to apply the overt vs.
personality-based distinction to safety variables. Van Iddekinge, Roth, Raymark, and
Odle-Dusseau (2012) conducted an extensive meta-analytic study to examine the
criterion-related validity evidence from 104 studies representing 134 independent
samples, aiming to explore the “perceived lack of methodological rigor” within the
integrity testing literature. The results indicated that criterion-related validities differed
significantly according to features of the study design. The article stated, “it has been
suggested that the most relevant validity evidence for integrity tests and counterproductive work behavior comes from studies that use predictive designs, applicant
samples, and non-self-report criteria” (p. 518).
The current study employed each one of these elements, with the goal of detecting
the soundest evidence for relationships between safety-related variables. Specifically,
data was collected across multiple time periods using actual applicants in a predictive
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design, as opposed to single-reports using student participants or a convenience sample,
as is commonly done. Safety-related pre-employment measures were completed by
applicants but were not used in determining their hiring potential, reducing possible
effects of range restriction. Outcome variables were gathered at a later date, employing a
longitudinal component and thereby reducing common method bias and facilitating an
exploration of true causation. Lastly, objective accident/injury data was gathered from
OSHA records to negate limitations associated with self-report criteria.
Another strength of the current study is the proposed theoretical approach and
analytic strategy. House et al. (1995) argues that researchers must adopt a “meso
paradigm” in order to form integrated organizational theories. The authors explain that a
meso paradigm links macro and micro concepts in studies, and according to their
research, the majority of published articles fail to take into account. There are multiple
ways a study can embrace the meso paradigm; the current study adopts the multilevel
effects type, where effects from two levels (individual and group) are examined as
interrelated concepts. The multilevel theoretical perspective included in the current study
is especially important given that workplace safety literature has not typically employed
this approach (Burke & Signal, 2010).
Furthermore, the current study addressed a deficiency noted by Wallace and Chen
(2006), which is the incorporation of both personal and situational antecedents in safety
literature. The use of both the employee and the environment as predictors of workplace
safety is important, as work accidents have been stated to be the result of a complex
interaction between the two (Janicak, 1996).
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In sum, although few significant relationships were found in the current study due
to low sample size associated with logistical constraints, it may serve as an example of
how empirical research can and should adopt best practices for study design, theoretical
approach, and analytic strategy. It is also important to note these elements far outweigh
the statistical non-significance of the results. In a recent article in the “The IndustrialOrganizational Psychologist,” a SIOP publication, Mills and Woo (2012) emphasize the
substantial impact that sample size has on the likelihood of finding statistical
significance, concluding that empirical researchers “must value all well-designed
research, regardless of whether or not the results are statistically significant” (p. 52). The
authors also noted that replication is the true key to the advancement of science and that it
is the establishment of a pattern that lays the groundwork for valuable insights. Future
researchers are encouraged, therefore, to test and re-test the relationships in this important
area of research while employing the soundest of research methods to gain a truer
understanding of how individual and situational variables affect workplace safety.
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Appendix A
Figures

Safety Climate Strength

Personality – Based
Safety Items
Conscientiousness
Risk-Taking Propensity
Safety Locus of Control

Safety Performance
Safety Compliance
Safety Participation

Overt Safety Items
Self-Report Format
SJT Format

Figure 1: The hypothesized model (condensed version).
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Safety Outcomes
Objective
Work Days Missed
Restricted Work Days
Micro-Accidents
Subjective
Near-Misses
Minor Injuries
MSK Pain

Figure 2: The hypothesized model (full version).
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Appendix B
Tables
Table 1: Safety Locus of Control Items
Item
Modified from:
Scale: SLOC_Likert
1* Preventing accidents in the
Jones & Webker
workplace is the responsibility
(1993)
of the company. (Reverse
scored)
2

Avoiding accidents at work is Jones & Webker
a matter of having good luck.
(1993)
(Reverse scored)
3 It is pointless to follow safety
Janicak (1996)
requirements that are unrelated
to the job. (Reverse scored)
4 The average employee can
Janicak (1996)
play a role in accident
prevention at work.
5 One of the major reasons why
Janicak (1996)
accidents occur is because
employees don't take enough
interest in safety.
6 It is hard to have control over
Janicak (1996)
the things that cause accidents
at work. (Reverse scored)
Scale: SLOC_Rational
7 Who is responsible for
Talent
ensuring that safe work
management
practices are followed?
company

8

When two people are involved
in an accident, how often is it
the fault of both people?

Talent
management
company

*Removed from the final scale
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Response scale
1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree
Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

Idem

1 = Safety experts
2 = Supervisors
3 = Managers
4 = Safety Trainers
5 = Employees
1 = Always
2 = Often
3 = Sometimes
4 = Rarely
5 = Never

Table 2: Risk Propensity Items
Item
Scale: Risk_Likert
1 By taking risks, I get my job
done faster.

2 I'd rather be a risk-taker than
overly cautious.
3 I don't mind taking risks at work
even when there is a small
chance I could get hurt.
4 I usually view risks as a
challenge.
5 I prefer to avoid taking risks at
work. (Reverse scored)
Scale: Risk_Rational
6 How often do you act on
impulse and think about the
result later?

Modified from:

Response scale

Westaby &
Lowe (2009)

1 = Strongly Agree
2 = Agree
3 = Neutral
4 = Disagree
5 = Strongly Disagree
Idem

Westaby and
Lee (2003)
Westaby and
Lee (2003)
Meertens et al.
(2008)
Meertens et al.
(2008)
Talent
management
company

7 How often do you take chances
or shortcuts?

Talent
management
company

8 In my ideal job, people
sometimes make decisions and
actions in a quick manner
without analyzing all the
information or take risks to
move people or the business
ahead quicker than planned.

Talent
management
company

118

Idem

Idem
Idem

1 = Always
2 = Often
3 = Sometimes
4 = Rarely
5 = Never
1 = Always
2 = Often
3 = Sometimes
4 = Rarely
5 = Never
1 = Most desirable
2 = Somewhat
desirable
3 = Neither
4 = Somewhat
undesirable
5 = Most undesirable

Table 3: Conscientiousness Items
Item
Modified from:
Response scale
Scale: Conscientiousness_Likert
Others would say …
1 I do a thorough job.
John &
1 = Strongly Disagree
Srivastava
2 = Disagree
(1999)
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree
2 I persevere on a task
John &
Idem
until it is finished.
Srivastava
(1999)
3 I do things efficiently.
John &
Idem
Srivastava
(1999)
4 I am a reliable worker.
John &
Idem
Srivastava
(1999)
5 I follow through with
John &
Idem
plans I make.
Srivastava
(1999)
Scale: Conscientiousness_Rational
1 In my ideal job, the
Talent
1 = Most desirable
organization considers
management
2 = Somewhat desirable
many data points and
company
3 = Neither
thoroughly evaluates
4 = Somewhat undesirable
issues and it is important
5 = Most undesirable
to have work completed
without errors even at
the minor detail level.
2 What would others say
Talent
1 = Works much harder than
about how hard you
management
others
work?
company
2 = Works harder than others
3 = Works as hard as others
4 = Works less than others
5 = Works much less than
others
3 How would others rate
Talent
1 = Much more error free
the quality of your
management
than others
work?
company
2 = More error free than
others
3 = About the same as others
4 = Needs to have others
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4 How often do you think
you will be absent from
work this year (not
including paid time off)?
5 Which of the following
statements best describes
you?

Talent
management
company

6 Compared to others,
how thoroughly do you
clean?

Talent
management
company

7 How would you like to
be described by your
fellow employees?

Talent
management
company

Talent
management
company

120

cross-check work for
accuracy
5 = Never been solely
responsible for producing
error free work
1 = Never
2 = Once or twice
3 = Three of four times
4 = Five or more times
1 = I enjoy straightening
things up so they look nice.
2 = I am messy, but I keep
things clean.
3 = I don't care much about
keeping things neat or clean.
4 = I think keeping things
neat and tidy is a waste of
time.
1 = Much more thoroughly
than others
2 = More thoroughly than
others
3 = About the same as others
4 = Less thoroughly than
others
5 = Much less thoroughly
than others
1 = Something not listed
above
2 = Fun to work with
3 = Knowledgeable
4 = Helpful
5 = Dependable

Table 4: Overt Safety Items
Item

Modified
from:

Response scale

Scale: OvertSafety_Likert
1 I follow safety rules
with few reminders.

Created

2

Created

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree
Idem

Created

Idem

Created

Idem

Created

1 = Ask your supervisor for a
different task.
2 = Complete the task but not
wear the PPE.
3 = Only wear the PPE when your
supervisor is around.
4 = Wear the PPE until you get
too uncomfortable.
5 = Wear the PPE for the duration
of the task
1 = Nothing
2 = It depends on whether the rule
is really necessary.
3 = Tell the supervisor.
4 = Wait for another coworker to
come by so you can approach the
employee together.
5 = Immediately approach the
employee to tell him/her that a
safety rule is being broken.

I believe in "safety
first."
3 I believe it's
acceptable to bend
or break safety rules
if no one will get
hurt. (Reverse
scored)
4* I don't believe the
same safety rules
apply to everyone.
(Reverse scored)
Scale: OvertSafety_Rational
5 You know you are
supposed to wear
personal protective
equipment (PPE) for
a task you must
complete. However,
it is uncomfortable
and seems
unnecessary. What
do you do?
6 You see a coworker
breaking a safety
rule. What would
you do?

Created
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7

One hour before
your shift ends your
supervisor tells you
to complete some
additional work.
This work will take
you 2 hours to
complete if you
follow the safety
procedures. Some of
the safety procedures
are probably not
needed to complete
this task. What
would you do?

Talent
management
company

8

You were late for
Talent
work and your
management
supervisor has been
company
watching you closely
today. Your last job
duty is to tag and
move some heavy
product. Safety rules
state you should do
this work with
another person, but
nobody is available.
If you don't get the
work done now your
shift will end and
you will have
assigned work
unfinished. What
should you do?
*Removed from the final scale
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1 = Complete the work without
following any of the safety
procedures
2 = For each safety issue,
carefully consider the risks
involved
3 = Pay attention to the really
serious safety procedures but
ignore those you think are
unnecessary
4 = Follow all safety procedures
and do as much as you can till
your shift ends, then tell your
supervisor you can't finish the
work
5 = Tell your supervisor
immediately that you won't be
able to finish the work by the
time your shift ends
1 = Ask your supervisor to
temporarily suspend the safety
rule until you finish your work
2 = Get another employee to say
he helped you even though he
didn't
3 = Complete the work keeping
careful watch for others so you
don't get caught
4 = Wait for your supervisor to
tell you what to do
5 = Tell your supervisor you can't
finish the work until tomorrow

Table 5: Safety Climate Items
Source:
Modified from
Zohar & Luria
(2005)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Response Scale
1 = Strongly
Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree

My department manager…
Makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to do the job safely.
Frequently checks to see if we are all obeying the safety rules.
Discusses how to improve safety with us.
Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act safely.
Emphasizes safety procedures when we are working under pressure.
Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule.
Makes sure we follow all the safety rules (not just the most important
ones).
Says a “good word” to workers who pay special attention to safety.
Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety hazards.
Quickly corrects any safety hazard (even if it’s costly).
Insists we wear our protective equipment even if it is uncomfortable.
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Table 6: Safety Performance Items
Safety Compliance
My coworkers would say…
1
I use all the necessary safety
equipment to do my job.

2

I use the correct safety
procedures for carrying out my
job.
3
I carry out my work in a safe
manner.
Safety Participation
1
I put in extra effort to improve
the safety of the workplace.
2
I point out to management any
safety related matters that I
notice.
3
I assist others to make sure they
perform their work safely.

Source
Neal & Griffin
(2004)

Neal & Griffin
(2004)

Response Scale
1 = Strongly
Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree
Idem

Vinodkumar &
Bhasi (2010)

Idem

Neal & Griffin
(2004)
Modified from
Vinodkumar &
Bhasi (2010)
Hofmann et al.
(2003)

Idem
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Idem

Idem

Table 7: Subjective Safety Outcomes Items
Source

NearMiss

Minor
Injuries

In the last year, how many
work-related near misses (an
incident that could have
resulted in an injury but did
not) have you experienced at
[store name]?
In the last year, how many
times did you have a minor
injury (cut, scrape, etc.) that
did not require treatment?

Musculo- In the last year, how many
times did you experience
skeletal
musculoskeletal pain?
Pain
Musculoskeletal problems
refer to a variety of injuries
and illnesses, including:
Muscle strains and back
injuries that occur from
repeated use or overexertion.
Symptoms include pain in the
hands, arms, shoulders, neck,
back, legs or feet, and may
include swelling, numbness,
tingling and a feeling of
heaviness in the affected area.
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Response
Scale
Modified from 1 = None
Goldenhar, et al. 2 = 1-2
(2003)
3 = 3-4
4 = 5-6
5 = 7 or more
Modified from 1 = None
Sinclair, Martin, 2 = 1-2
& Sears (2010) 3 = 3-4
4 = 5-6
5 = 7 or more
Modified from 1 = None
Sinclair, Martin, 2 = 1-3
& Sears (2010) 3 = 4-6
4 = 7-9
5 = 10 or more

Table 8: Descriptive statistics, Individual-level inter-correlations, and Reliability statistics.
N Mean SD
1
2
3
4
1
1 Safety Locus of Control – Likert
197 4.50 0.45 (.651)
2 Risk Propensity - Likert
197 4.26 0.71 .476** (.794)
3 Conscientiousness - Likert
197 4.74 0.35 .460** .372** (.763)
1
4 Overt Safety - Self-Report Format
197 4.78 0.37 .454** .356** .531** (.509)
5 Overt Safety- SJT Format
197 4.32 0.44 0.128 0.121 0.092
0.082
6 Group Safety Climate Average
196 4.52 0.65 0.079 0.040 0.093 -0.014
2
7 Group Safety Climate Strength
188 0.68 0.23 -0.028 0.051 0.059
0.092
8 Safety Performance
197 4.65 0.49 .213** .176* .215** 0.130
9 Near-Misses
197 1.10 0.30 0.023 -0.024 -0.081 -0.026
10 Minor Injuries
197 1.30 0.73 0.080 0.025 0.072
0.068
11 Work-Related MSK Pain
197 1.47 0.94 0.046 0.064 -0.015 0.049
12 Missed Work Days
6
6.67 12.82 0.248 0.332 -0.697 0.255
13 Restricted Work Days
6
5.33 13.06 -0.417 0.446 0.463
0.200
14 Micro-Accidents
6
0.67 0.52 -0.440 -0.217 0.266 -0.316
* Correlation is significant at p < .05 (two-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at p < .01 (two-tailed)
1
Reflects modified scales 2Reflects restricted sample to groups >3
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5

6

(.325)
-0.008
-0.007
-0.062
0.071
-0.069
-0.012
.968**
-0.333
-0.802

(.969)
-.147*
.615**
-0.103
-0.087
-.396**
0.361
0.445
-0.064

Table 8 (continued): Descriptive statistics, Individual-level Inter-correlations, and Reliability statistics.
N Mean SD
7
8
9
10
1
1 Safety Locus of Control – Likert
197 4.50 0.45
2 Risk Propensity - Likert
197 4.26 0.71
3 Conscientiousness - Likert
197 4.74 0.35
1
4 Overt Safety - Self-Report Format
197 4.78 0.37
5 Overt Safety- SJT Format
197 4.32 0.44
6 Group Safety Climate Average
196 4.52 0.65
2
7 Group Safety Climate Strength
188 0.68 0.23
8 Safety Performance
197 4.65 0.49 -0.018
(.944)
9 Near-Misses
197 1.10 0.30 -0.096
-0.055
10 Minor Injuries
197 1.30 0.73
0.052
0.025
.296**
11 Work-Related MSK Pain
197 1.47 0.94
0.141
-.289** .227** .318**
12 Missed Work Days
6
6.67 12.82 -.812*
0.255
.968**
0.403
13 Restricted Work Days
6
5.33 13.06 -0.159
0.200
-0.200
-0.632
14 Micro-Accidents
6
0.67 0.52
0.685
-0.316
-0.632
-0.500
* Correlation is significant at p < .05 (two-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at p < .01 (two-tailed)
1
Reflects modified scales 2Reflects restricted sample to groups >3
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11

12

13

.866*
-0.400
-0.791

-0.255
-0.806

0.316

Table 9: Demographics of Matched Participants
Age
Under 20 years of age
20 to 24 years of age
25 to 29 years of age
30 to 34 years of age
35 to 39 years of age
40 to 44 years of age
45 to 49 years of age
50 to 54 years of age
55 to 59 years of age
60 years of age or older
Gender
Males
Females
Race / Ethnicity
White
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Asian
American Indian or Alaska Native
Two or more races
Department
Front-end – Cashier
Front-end – Bagger
Front-end – Accounting
Front-end – Customer Service
Grocery – Stock Crew
Fresh Foods (Deli/ Bakery)
Meat
Seafood
Produce
Floral
Dairy/ Frozen
Pharmacy
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N
44
53
15
13
11
10
14
14
11
12

%
22.3
26.9
7.6
6.6
5.6
5.1
7.1
7.1
5.6
6.1

110
87

55.8
44.2

126
52
9
7
2
1

64.0
26.4
4.6
3.6
1.0
0.5

94
10
1
1
24
41
3
1
14
6
2
94

47.7
5.1
0.5
0.5
12.2
20.8
1.5
0.5
7.1
3.0
1.0
47.7

Table 9 (continued): Demographics of Matched Participants
Tenure
N
%
0 days – 45 days of service
58
29.4
46 days – 182 days of service
139
70.6
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Table 10.1: Reliability Coefficients of Personality and Overt Safety Variables
Before
After
Item
Cronbach's Alpha
Deletion
Deletion
Deleted
Conscientiousness - Likert
0.763
n/a
Conscientiousness - Rational

0.579

Scale Not Used

Risk Propensity - Likert

0.794

n/a

Risk Propensity - Rational

0.418

Scale Not Used

Safety Locus of Control - Likert

0.566

Safety Locus of Control Rational

-0.157

Overt Safety - Likert

0.486

Overt Safety- Rational

0.325
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0.651

SLOC.1

Scale Not Used
0.509

OSafe.4
n/a

Table 10.2: Confirmatory Factor Analyses on Personality-Oriented Variables
Model
Number
Model Description
Chi-Square
CFI
RMSEA
All personality items clustered into
respective scales (i.e., Safety Locus of
561.48, p <.001
0.84
0.06
1
Control, Risk Propensity,
Conscientiousness)
Personality items clustered by response
option (i.e., SLOC-Likert, SLOC489.43, p < .001
0.89
0.05
2
Rational, Risk-Likert, Risk-Rational,
Consc.-Likert, Consc.-Rational)
Personality items clustered by response
3
option with low-reliability item removed
121.88, p < .01
0.96
0.05
(Final
Model) (SLOC-Likert item #1)
Notes: SLOC = Safety Locus of Control, Consc. = Conscientiousness, CFI = Comparative
Factor Index, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation

131

Table 11: VIF and Tolerance Test to Check Multicollinearity with all Predictors
on Safety Performance
Variance
Independent
Toleran
2
Step
R
R
Inflation
Variables
ce
Factor (VIF)
1 Group Size
.028 .001
1.00
1.00
Safety locus of control
.558
1.791
(Likert)
Risk-taking propensity
.676
1.478
(Likert)
2 Conscientiousness(Likert)
.247 .061
.665
1.504
Overt safety - Self-report
.660
1.514
format
Overt safety- SJT format
.942
1.061
Notes: n = 197; a two-step hierarchical linear regression was conducted in
order to partially account for group size and maintain consistency with the
other analyses in the current study.
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Table 12: Tests of Safety Performance as Mediators of the Personality-Based Safety - Safety Outcomes Relationships.
Direct
Indirect 95% CI for a*b
Total
95% CI for c'
effects
effects
effects
IV
M
DV
(c')
Lower Upper
(a*b)
Lower Upper
(c)
Near-0.502
-1.790
0.786
-0.080
-0.451
0.157
-0.582
misses
Safety
Conscientiousness Performanc Minor
0.147
-0.164
0.457
0.003
-0.073
0.063
0.150
injuries
e
MSK pain
0.112
-0.256
0.481
-0.136
-0.350
-0.025
-0.024

Risk Propensity

Safety
Performanc
e

Nearmisses
Minor
injuries
MSK pain

Safety Locus of
Control

Safety
Performanc
e

Nearmisses
Minor
injuries
MSK pain

Samples
5,000
80,000
5,000

-0.034

-0.705

0.636

-0.039

-0.204

0.044

-0.075

5,000

0.050

-0.103

0.203

0.002

-0.026

0.029

0.052

5,000

0.145

-0.035

0.326

-0.057

-0.150

-0.008

0.088

5,000

0.494

-0.637

1.625

-0.085

-0.399

0.084

0.407

5,000

0.140

-0.098

0.378

0.002

-0.059

0.050

0.142

100,000
*

0.186

-0.097

0.469

-0.104

-0.268

-0.019

0.083

5,000

n = 197
IV = independent variable; M = mediator; DV = dependent variable
* Indicates bootstrap confidence interval endpoints may be untrustworthy due to requiring more bootstrap samples
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Table 13: Tests of Safety Performance as Mediators of the Overt Safety - Safety Outcomes Relationships.
Direct
Indirect
95% CI for c'
95% CI for a*b
effects
effects
IV
M
DV
(c')
Lower Upper
(a*b)
Lower
Upper
0.429
-0.632
1.489
0.034
-0.048
0.253
Near-misses
Minor
Overt Safety
Safety
-0.096
-0.330
0.139
-0.002
-0.039
0.022
- SJT format Performance injuries
MSK pain
Near-misses
Overt Safety
Minor
Safety
- Self-report
Performance injuries
format
MSK pain

Total
effects (c)
0.462

Samples
5,000

-0.098

5,000

-0.079

-0.358

0.200

0.052

-0.015

0.167

-0.028

100,000*

0.037

-1.222

1.296

-0.045

-0.359

0.048

-0.008

5,000

0.105

-0.182

0.391

0.003

-0.026

0.061

0.108

5,000

0.262

-0.076

0.601

-0.063

-0.229

0.037

0.199

5,000

n = 197
IV = independent variable; M = mediator; DV = dependent variable
* Indicates bootstrap confidence interval endpoints may be untrustworthy due to requiring more bootstrap samples
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Table 14: Hierarchical Linear Regressions of Personality Variables x Safety Climate Strength in Predicting Safety Performance
Model 1
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Total
Safety
Safety
ConscienGroup
ConscienRace Gender Age Tenure
Climate
Climate
tiousness x
Size
tiousness
Average
Strength
SCS
2
0.002
0.004
0.391
0.005
0.000
0.403
R
0.015 -0.040
0.005
0.018
-0.069
0.638***
0.071
-0.006
-0.064
(β)
Risk
Propensity
R2
(β)

0.006
-0.033
Safety Locus
of Control

R2
(β)
SCS = Safety Climate Strength, SLOC = Safety Locus of Control
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
n = 189
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0.006
-0.037

Risk
Propensity x
SCS
0.003
0.278

0.407

SLOC x SCS
0.004
0.260

0.408

Table 15: Hierarchical Linear Regressions of Overt Safety Variables x Safety Climate Strength in Predicting Safety Performance
Model 1
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Total
Safety
Safety
Overt Safety
Group
Overt Safety
Race Gender Age Tenure
Climate
Climate
(Rational) x
Size
(Rational)
Average
Strength
SCS
R2
(β)

0.015

0.002
-0.040
0.005

0.018

0.004
-0.069

0.391
0.638***

R2
(β)
SCS = Safety Climate Strength
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
n = 189

0.005
0.024

0.001
-0.107

Overt Safety
(Likert)

Overt Safety
(Likert) x SCS

0.071

0.008
0.057
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0.006
-0.289

0.404

0.411

Table 16: Logistic Regression of Personality-Oriented Variables Predicting Likelihood of
Accidents/Injuries
95% CI for Odds Ratio
Variables
Δχ2
Odds
entered
B
S.E.
removal
Ratio
Lower
Upper
Constant
13.921
6136.951
----Race
-18.428
6136.951
4.470*
0.000
0.000
a
-0.293
0.967
0.092
0.746
0.112
4.970
Gender
Age
0.100
0.145
0.472
1.106
0.833
1.468
Group Size
1.339
1.459
1.050
3.814
0.219
66.513
-2.208
4.203
0.262
0.110
0.000
415.873
Safety LOC
-0.400
2.226
0.031
0.670
0.009
52.539
Risk Propensity
-6.426
3.597
3.142
0.002
0.000
1.869
Conscientiousness
2
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 4.92, df = 3, n = 213, R L = 0.134,
Null Model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 54.67, Control Model -2LL = 36.75, Final Model -2 LL
= 31.84. Tenure was removed as a control variable because it severely restricted sample size;
separate analyses indicated it did not significantly predict accident/injury occurrence. a = Set to
system missing due to overflow.
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Table 17: Logistic Regression of Overt Safety Variables Predicting Likelihood of
Accidents/Injuries
95% CI for Odds
Ratio
Δχ2
Odds
Variables entered
B
S.E.
removal
Ratio
Lower
Upper
Constant
----15.33
6398.586
Race
-18.312 6398.586
5.210*
0.00
0.00
.a
Gender (males)
-0.484
0.9144
0.282
0.616
0.103
3.699
Age
0.114
0.1356
0.694
1.121
0.859
1.462
Group Size
0.160
0.9777
0.027
1.173
0.173
7.972
Overt Safety - Likert
2.694
2.5092
1.177
14.794
0.108 2022.725
Overt Safety Rational
-0.657
1.3821
0.274
0.518
0.035
7.781
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.93, df = 2, n = 213, R2L =
0.026, Null model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 54.67, Control Model -2LL = 36.75,
Model -2 LL = 35.81. Tenure was removed as a control variable because it severely
restricted sample size; separate analyses indicated it did not significantly predict
accident/injury occurrence. a = Set to system missing due to overflow.
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Table 18: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Safety Performance on Objective
Safety-Related Outcomes
Restricted Work Days
Missed Work Days
2
Step Variables entered
ΔR
(β)
ΔR2
(β)
1 Race
0.003
-0.035
0.004
-0.034
Gender
0.019
0.048
Age
0.032
0.007
2 Group Size
0.000
-0.006
0.000
-0.010
3 Safety Performance
0.002
0.043
0.001
0.029
2
R
0.005
0.005
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
n = 596
Note: Tenure was removed because it severely restricted sample size; separate
regression analyses indicated it did not significantly predict these outcomes.
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Table 19: Logistic Regression of Safety Performance Predicting Likelihood of MicroAccidents
95% CI for Odds
Ratio
Δχ2
Odds
Variables entered
B
S.E.
removal
Ratio
Lower
Upper
Constant
---2.182
0.488
-Race
0.194
0.150
1.875
1.214
0.904
1.630
-0.374
0.241
2.458
0.688
0.430
1.103
Gender
Age
-0.018
0.043
0.176
0.982
0.903
1.068
Group Size
-0.660
1.177
0.282
0.517
0.051
5.189
Safety Performance
-0.361
0.220
3.485
0.697
0.453
1.073
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 3.485, df = 1, n = 598, R2L =
0.007 Null model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 499.64, Control Model -2LL = 479.98,
Final Model -2 LL = 476.50. Tenure was removed as a control variable because it
severely restricted sample size; separate analyses indicated it did not significantly predict
micro-accidents.
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Table 20: Logistic Regression of Safety Performance Predicting Likelihood of
Accidents/Injuries
95% CI for Odds
Ratio
Δχ2
Odds
Variables entered
B
S.E.
removal
Ratio
Lower
Upper
Constant
-3.684
0.1656
----Race
-0.065
0.0475
1.984
0.937
0.853
1.028
Gender
0.137
0.0841
2.656
1.147
0.972
1.352
Age
0.051
0.0143
12.600***
1.052
1.023
1.082
Group Size
-0.113
0.5098
0.051
0.893
0.329
2.425
Safety Performance -0.038
0.073
0.491
0.963
0.834
1.111
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.491, df = 1, n = 17,287, R2L
= 0.000 Initial -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 5198.56, Control Model -2LL = 5135.48, Final
Model -2 LL = 5134.99. Tenure was removed as a control variable because it severely
restricted sample size; separate analyses indicated it did not significantly predict
accident/injury occurrence.
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Table 21: Logistic Regression of Safety Climate Average Predicting
Likelihood of Micro-Accidents
95% CI for
Odds Ratio
Variables
Δχ2
Odds
entered
B
S.E.
removal
Ratio
Lower Upper
Constant
0.5627
----2.531
Race
0.1623
1.474*
1.204
0.876
1.656
0.186
0.281
4.089
0.573
0.330
0.994
Gender
-0.557
Age
0.048
0.363
0.971
0.884
1.067
-0.029
Group Size
1.178
0.425
0.439
0.044
4.418
-0.823
Safety
0.186
0.410
1.027
0.713
1.479
Performance
0.027
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.410, df = 1, n =
466, R2L = 0.001 Null Model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 390.93, Control
Model -2LL = 367.56, Final Model -2 LL = 367.15. Tenure was removed as a
control variable because it severely restricted sample size; separate analyses
indicated it did not significantly predict micro-accidents.
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Table 22: Logistic Regression of Safety Climate Average Predicting Likelihood
of Accidents/Injuries
95% CI for Odds
Ratio
Variables
Δχ2
Odds
entered
B
S.E.
removal Ratio
Lower
Upper
Constant
-3.713
0.186
----Race
-0.081
0.052
2.570
0.922
0.832
1.021
0.190
0.096
3.947*
1.209
1.002
1.459
Gender
Age
0.045
0.016 8.069**
1.046
1.014
1.079
Group Size
-0.062
0.511
0.015
0.940
0.346
2.559
Safety Climate
0.021
0.069
0.160
1.021
0.891
1.170
Average
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.160, df = 1, n =
13,615, R2L = 0.000 Null Model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 4061.12, Control
Model = 3996.00, Final Model -2 LL = 3995.85. Tenure was removed as a
control variable because it severely restricted sample size; separate analyses
indicated it did not significantly predict accident/injury occurrence.
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Table 23: Logistic Regression of Safety Climate Strength Predicting Likelihood of MicroAccidents
95% CI for
Odds Ratio
Δχ2
Odds
Variables entered
B
S.E.
removal
Ratio
Lower Upper
Constant
2.420
0.709
----Race
0.189
0.163
1.512
1.208
0.878
1.661
-0.557
0.281
4.085*
0.573
0.330
0.995
Gender
Age
-0.029
0.048
0.355
0.972
0.884
1.068
Group Size
-0.791
1.185
0.391
0.454
0.044
4.623
Safety Climate Average
0.024
0.188
0.017
1.025
0.709
1.481
0.155
0.608
0.014
1.168
0.355
3.845
Safety Climate Strength
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.014, df = 1, n = 466, R2L = 0.000
Null Model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 390.83, Control Model = 367.84, Model -2 LL = 367.83.
Tenure was removed as a control variable because it severely restricted sample size; separate
analyses indicated it did not significantly predict micro-accidents.
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Table 24: Logistic Regression of Safety Climate Strength Predicting Likelihood of
Accidents/Injuries
95% CI for
Odds Ratio
Δχ2
Odds
Variables entered
B
S.E.
removal Ratio Lower Upper
Constant
-3.664
0.231
----Race
-0.081
0.052
2.583
0.922
0.832
1.021
0.191
0.096
3.981*
1.210
1.003
1.460
Gender
Age
0.045
0.016
8.062**
1.046
1.014
1.079
Group Size
-0.060
0.511
0.014
0.941
0.346
2.562
Safety Climate Average
0.021
0.070
0.093
1.021
0.891
1.171
Safety Climate Strength
-0.074
0.208
0.013
0.929
0.618
1.395
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, Final Model χ2 = 0.013 df = 1, n = 13,615,
R2L = 0.016 Null Model -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) = 4061.12, Control Model -2LL =
3995.92, Final Model -2 LL = 3995.90. Tenure was removed as a control variable
because it severely restricted sample size; separate analyses indicated it did not
significantly predict accident/injury occurrence.
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Table 25: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Average Safety Climate on Subjective Safety-Related Outcomes
Safety Performance
Near-Miss
Minor Injuries
MSK Pain
Variables
ΔR2
(β)
ΔR2
(β)
ΔR2
(β)
ΔR2
(β)
Step entered
0.001
0.017
0.001
-0.008
0.001
-0.011
0.000
0.004
1 Race
0.007
-0.025
-0.014
0.016
Gender
-0.003
0.006
-0.028
-0.005
Age
0.031*
0.016
0.018
-0.001
Tenure
0.000
0.021
0.001**
-0.037**
0.001
-0.021
0.000
-0.010
2 Group Size
Group Safety
Climate
0.392*** 0.627***
0.017
-0.129*** 0.012*** -0.110***
0.026*** -0.161***
3 Average
0.393
0.019
0.014
0.026
R2
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
n = 5,102
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Table 26: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Safety Climate Strength on Subjective Safety-Related Outcomes
Safety Performance
Near-Miss
Minor Injuries
ΔR
Step Variables entered
0.001
1 Race
Gender
Age
Tenure
0.000
2 Group Size
Group Safety
0.392***
3 Climate Average
Safety Climate
0.002***
4 Strength
0.396
R2
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
n = 5,102
2

(β)
0.017
0.007
-0.003
0.031*
0.021

ΔR
0.001

ΔR
0.001

0.001**

(β)
-0.008
-0.025
0.006
0.016
-0.037**

0.627***

0.017

0.051***

0.000

2

MSK Pain
ΔR
0.000

0.001

(β)
-0.011
-0.014
-0.028
0.018
-0.021

0.000

(β)
0.004
0.016
-0.005
-0.001
-0.010

-0.129***

0.012***

-0.110***

0.026***

-0.161***

0.009

0.000

0.010

0.010

0.010

0.019

2

0.014
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2

0.026

Table 27: Hierarchical Linear Regression of Safety Performance on Subjective Safety-Related
Outcomes
Near-Miss
Minor Injuries
MSK Pain
Ste
p

Variables
entered
1 Race
Gender
Age
Tenure
2 Group Size

ΔR2
0.001

0.001**

Safety
0.007***
3 Performance
R2
0.009
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
n = 5,658

(β)
-0.008
-0.025
0.006
0.016
-0.037**

ΔR2
0.001

ΔR2
0.000

0.000

(β)
-0.011
-0.014
-0.028*
0.018
-0.021

0.000

(β)
0.004
0.016
-0.005
-0.001
-0.01

-0.084***

0.006***

-0.080***

0.009***

-0.095***

0.008
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0.009
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